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 The relationship between cartography and law provides a 
unique focus through which to examine mixed legal 
jurisdictions. Through an exploration of the various uses of law, 
cartography, and nation building, the author postulates that 
mixed legal jurisdictions are created through the subtle 
incorporation of the originally unfamiliar “Other”. In Canada, 
European settlers asserted sovereignty through the mapping and 
naming of territory in ways that did not accord with traditional 
Aboriginal patterns of usage or conceptualizations of space. The 
eventual creation of a legal middle ground between these 
peoples, as articulated by Richard White, is the basis of the 
author’s analysis of Israel/Palestine. From the middle ground of 
mutual understanding, which is an alternative to the use of 
force, there is a potential for alternative cartographies and legal 
traditions to emerge.  
 The centrality of the Holy Land in all three monotheistic 
religions has led to a proliferation ofmaps of that region, all of 
which communicate information that surpasses the mere physical 
description of the place. Both maps and laws are sources of 
authority that seek to orient an individual’s intellectual 
perception of reality. Modern cartography recognizes that it is an 
ethnocentric projection to assume that there is a single 
conceptualization of space through which all others must be 
assessed. The author theorizes that certain silences in maps 
parallel silences in law, and that the contemporary focus on both 
is an attempt to promote social justice by attending to those who 
are ignored or marginalized byoth of these disciplines.  
 Maps depict the physical borders of modern states, as well 
as the borders of legal jurisd ctions. In defining these boundaries, 
the power creating the map superimposes a system of 
measurement that is the basis of future property transactions. The 
system selected is inextricably linked to specific conceptions of 
governance, society, and control. The result of these linkages is 
that maps are literally a reflection f the power that created them. 
The middle ground between those with the power to create 
official maps and those without such power emerges by reading 
alternative maps in combination with other historical maps. The 
author suggests that this process requires subjective attention to 
the content of both official and alternative maps, in an effort to 
create a mutual understanding that is impossible when focusing 
solely on ideas such as “historical accuracy” and “correctness”. 
Le lien entre cartographie etdroit fournit une approche 
unique à la comparaison des juridictions de droits mixtes. 
L’exploration des différents emplois du droit, de la cartographie 
et de la construction étatique sert de base au postulat de l’auteure 
selon lequel les juridictions de droits mixtes sont le fruit de la 
subtile intégration d’un «Autre» originellement inconnu. Au 
Canada, les colonisateurs européens firent respecter leur 
souveraineté sur le territoire en le renommant et le délimitant 
d’une manière tout à fait étrangère aux conceptions de l’espace et 
coutumes autochtones traditionnelles. Partant de l’exemple de la 
création subséquente d’un terrain d’entente juridique entre ces 
peuples, tel que décrit par Richard White, l’auteure étend son 
analyse au cas israélo-palestinien. À partir d’un terrain d'entente 
caractérisé par la compréhensio  mutuelle, une alternative à 
l’emploi de la force, il est possible de voir apparaître des 
cartographies et traditions juridiques alternatives. 
 La situation centrale de la Terre Sainte pour les trois 
religions monothéistes a mené à la prolifération des cartes de la 
région, communiquant toutes des informations qui dépassent la 
simple description de l’espace physique. Les cartes comme le 
droit sont des sources d’autorité qui cherchent à influencer la 
perception intellectuelle qu’un individu a de la réalité. Les 
cartographes modernes reconnaissent que penser qu’une seule 
conception de l’espace dicte toutes l  autres relève de la 
projection ethnocentrique. L’auteur avance l’idée que certains 
mutismes cartographiques font écho à des mutismes juridiques et 
que l’intérêt que nous portons à ces vides est une tentative 
d’ ncourager la justice sociale en nous préoccupant de ceux qui 
sont ignorés ou marginalisés par ces deux disciplines. 
Les cartes tracent les frontières physiques entre les pays 
modernes, ainsi que les frontières juridictionnelles. En 
dé inissant ces frontières, les autorités à l’origine d'une carte y 
superposent un système de mesur  qui constituera la base de 
transactions foncières futures. Le système choisi est 
inextricablement lié à des conceptions spécifiques de ce que sont 
le ouvernement, la société et le contrôle. Il en résulte que les 
cartes sont littéralement le reflet direct du pouvoir qui les a 
créées. Le terrain d’entente entre ceux qui ont le pouvoir de 
dessiner les cartes officielles et ceux qui n’ont pas ce pouvoir 
apparaît lorsqu’on se penche sur les cartes alternatives, en 
combinaison avec d'autres cartes hi toriques. L’auteure soumet 
que ce processus nécessite une att ntion subjective au tracé des 
cartes officielles et non officielles, afin de parvenir à une entente 
mutuelle autrement impossible sil’on ne s’attarde qu’à des 
principes tels l’«exactitude historique» et la «justesse». 
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 Immersed as I have been over the last several years in research on 
Israel/Palestine, I am by now familiar with a recurring preface written on the occasion 
of a book’s publication, or introductory remarks spoken as a book gets published, 
with the author scrambling to incorporate developments that occurred since the 
manuscript was sent to the printer. These comments are typically written in a final 
preface. The writers take stock and try to reassess what they thought they knew at the 
time with what they know now. This checking of recent events against the narrative 
that they generated is part of the process of assessing history. They hope that their 
prior sense-making has had sufficient time-durable generality that what was 
prefigured in their rendering has framed what is relevant for the future. They evince 
an awareness of how previous endeavors have misread the cues about something that 
appeared innocuous but was really a tinderbox, or something that sounded ominous 
and grave yet was really only a death rattle. Time, though under one apprehension 
objectively measurable in discrete, uniform units, seems to profess something else as 
well—a story to be told, a judgment to be called. 
 These authors, in their prefaces, place recent developments within the context of 
their account. They take stock of time. The story—whichever story in the Middle 
East, in the Holy Land, or in the human heart and soul that they have focused upon—
the story that they put to paper at a particular moment in history was part of a deeper, 
longer, ongoing story, whose unfolding could notfully, and with absolute certainty, be 
anticipated when the sense-making began. History, though we are participants in it 
because we are alive (and sometimes because we are dying or dead),1 appears to have 
stories to tell of its own. 
 For these writers, struggling to put the original story to paper was simultaneously 
an effort, humble as most writing is, to shape the outcome of the story. In the context 
of these particular narratives, writing is a struggle to gather the explosively fractured 
bits and pieces of the past and rearrange them in such a manner that a compelling, 
though yet inchoate, sense of injustice might be rendered. Thus rendered, the story 
embodies an aspiration that its details might be accounted for in the general sweep 
and jumble of the contemporary moment; thus accounted for, that truth and justice 
might one day be enthroned. 
 I begin writing today, similarly lacking certainty about where the future will go 
from here, from the vantage point of a current news article in the Globe and Mail 
entitled “Jerusalem’s sacred hill a flashpoint for conflict: Concerns about extremist 
attacks, collapse of mosque have authorities on high alert”:  
 
 
1 I have in mind Yasser Arafat who is, at the moment of my re-writing, “clinging to life in a military 
hospital near Paris” as Israel agrees to all w his body to be buried in Ramallah (New York Times (10 
November 2004). 
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In an Israeli police station at the Jaffa Gate into the Old City, in front of 
television screens picking up images from 280 cameras scattered across the 
densely populated heart of Jerusalem, a 24-hour watch goes on for stirrings of 
apocalypse. ... Israel’s security chiefs are wrestling with two nightmare 
scenarios they say are increasingly realistic—an attack on the mosques by 
Jewish extremists trying to stop Israel’s planned withdrawal from the Gaza 
Strip, and a collapse of parts of the structurally shaky mosque compound onto 
thousands of Muslim worshippers. Muslims would almost certainly blame 
either catastrophe on the Israeli government and transform its conflict with the 
Arabs into a full-blown religious war.2  
This is the dread-filled atmosphere surrounding the summit of Mount Moriah, the 
exposed and sheltered rock that has been named the navel of the world in several 
world religions.3 From that place comes an alarm, sounded by Avi Dichter, the 
director of Shin Bet, Israel’s secret service. In light of what the agency describes as a 
threat to Israel’s existence, Dichter alerts us that “everyone should be losing sleep.”4  
 Everyone should be losing sleep? Everyone?! The world is a much larger place 
than the scratch of rock upon which Abraham is said to have offered up his son Isaac 
to the God of the Abrahamic religions;5 larger than the swatch of land and desert and 
sea that makes up Israel/Palestine; and larger than the lands that make up the Middle 
East. Other traumas, ancient and open-wounded, abound in places near and far. Other 
Gods have touched the earth in other places. The silence of God has been heard 
resoundingly in the world’s other manifold places that are filled with grief and despair 
and contemplation.  
 One presumes that Avi Dichter would have been quoted believing he was 
speaking to an Israeli audience (he is, after all, the director of Is ael’s secret service); 
perhaps to a handful of ambassadors in the economy of world power who read 
national newspapers; perhaps to a few souls in a range of diasporas who care. Could 
he have meant that everyone should be losing sleep? Such a claim would seem to be a 
kind of self-centered navel gazing, as though the problems of one small group, one 
small people, should be the problems of the world. 
 
2 Karin Laub, “Jerusalem’s sacred hill a flashpoint for conflict: Concerns about extremist attacks, 
collapse of mosque have authorities on high alert” The Globe and Mail (18 October 2004) A12. 
3 The Dome of the Rock, now with its brilliant gold covered cupola, was built (beginning in 685 of 
the Common Era, or year 63 of the Hijra) by the 9th Umayyad Khalif, ’Abd al-Malik, over the Noble 
Rock, which is the focus of its interior. This brief outcropping of the earth’s bedrock, in the centre of 
the dome, is believed by Muslims to be the spot from which Mohammed was brought by night and 
ascended through the heavens to God. For the Jews too this place has otherworldly significance. This 
is not only the place where Abraham trembled before God with a knife to his beloved son’s throat, it is 
the place where Jacob saw the ladder to heaven; a place within the boundaries of the innermost 
chamber of the Jewish Temple; the place too, where the first stone was laid in the building of the 
world. See online: Wikipedia <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dome_of_the_Rock>. See also The 
Encyclopaedia Britannica, 15th ed., s.v. “Dome of the Rock”. 
4 Laub, supra note 2. 
5 This label includes Judaism, Christianity, Islam, and all their splintered variants. 
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 In the face of the manifest unlikelihood that Dichter was speaking to me, and 
despite knowing that the world covers a much larger surface than the ripples of 
culture and history that spread out from Mount Moriah, I am tempted to leave the 
epicenter of insomnia in the considerable distance that exists between Toronto and 
Jerusalem in 2004. These are not my people. These are not my conflicts. The 
remoteness of Mount Moriah from Toronto is one apparent reason to leave this issue 
alone and to turn my own investigations in law to landscapes closer to home.  
 There is a more shameful reason for my reticence to wake up. It is akin to a fear 
of being banished from a comforting world of familiar values, in this case the values 
that derive from shared Canadian certainties about history and about anti-Semitism.6 
Full, awake, open-eyed alertness to the depth of suffering brought about by anti-
Semitism, contemporary and historical, is in many ways a core obligation of full and 
enlightened citizenship in Canada. Acknowledgement of the harmful consequences of 
all forms of racism has shaped our laws, domestic and international.7 It seems 
impossibly premature to leave that territory now (the nation of those committed, in 
the only ways we so far know, to it happening Never Again) as it is still being 
mapped out and adept cartographers and lawmakers are still needed. That nation of 
empathic humanity embodies a sense of injustice that is so deep and terrible that it 
seems still impossible to ever fully encompass and comprehend. Moving beyond the 
national contours of those shared values seem to present a willful betrayal of all of 
the missions associated with that nation. It can seem as though one were no longer 
committed to genocide happening Never Again, rather than just being no longer 
committed to the only ways we know so far of avoiding a return to the unthinkable. It 
can seem as though the Jews are left isolated in the mission to fulfill the commitment 
to a future of Never Again. If this is a familiar world from which to be exiled, it is not 
a familiar world of comfort and decadence; it is a familiar world of fragile humanity. 
 Though this shared world of recognition can hardly be an Eden given how 
fraught it is with grief and violence, the dread of being branded and sent into a cold 
and lonely exile keeps a somnolence warm and close. Writing from the same 
perspective from which the Globe article was read today, it is also a semi-somnolent 
trepidation about doing harm. Marc Ellis, a Jewish theologian in the Prophetic 
tradition, has called this holding back the ecumenical deal:  
[T]he religious dialogue of Jews and Christians after the Holocaust, which 
features Jewish empowerment in Israel s untouchable and the critics of Israel 
 
6 The word “certainties” is not too strong in the context of imputing specifically Canadian values, 
since Canada’s Supreme Court has given judicial notice to the Holocaust in R. v. Zundel, [1992] 2 
S.C.R. 731, 95 D.L.R. (4th) 202, holding that evidence indicating the occurrence of the Holocaust 
need not be led. The Court assumes this history as background, in the way it can be assumed that 
water runs downhill, for the very great number of details hat may need to be proven on its backdrop.  
7 It has shaped, for example, the provisions of the Canadian Cr minal Code that deal with hate 
propaganda and the public incitement of hatred (Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, ss. 318-19); 
shaped also the postwar development of refugee law and given added impetus to the development of 
international conventions on human rights. 
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as anti-Semitic—is also a political deal. The political deal is either unqualified 
support of Israel and its politics or silence on them, lest again the accusation of 
anti-Semitism is made with its attendant political consequences. These 
consequences are well known: removal from the moral, ethical and political 
discourse of the nation.8  
A readiness to live in exile from this moral, ethical, and political nation (at least as we 
know it) must surely be approached with great wariness, for that nation includes an 
acute and pained awareness of the gulf of suffering that has given our contemporary 
moral world its known contours.  
 But as intimated by the (perhaps unwittingly multifaceted) nature of the place that 
Avi Dichter wants us to focus on, remaining alert and attentive to the world may 
mean encompassing more of the moral landscape than that narrow ecumenical deal 
asks us to embrace. Waking up may be to a bedrock that is as astonishingly new and 
unfamiliar as the first stone laid to build the world. If the place is indeed as 
multifaceted as the real world outcropping whose precariousness Dichter is anxiously 
alert to—the Haram El-Sharif/Temple Mount—, it may well signal the stirrings of 
some kind of anti-apocalypse—an incipient recognition that, as Ofer Grosbard 
phrases it, “The loss of our ability to listen is the greatest threat to our existence.”9 If 
these anti-apocalyptic stirrings are indeed rooted in the ability to recognize the 
“other”, in the fullness and dreadfulness and fragility of their humanity, then, as Marc 
Ellis also prophecies, we may be called to a deeper ecumenism, called to map out the 
inhabitable terrain of a wider sensibility.  
 It is in the spirit of this deeper ecumenical call (which includes both profound 
secularism and profound religiosity) that I am writing about mixed legal traditions in 
Israel/Palestine. I am calling the stirrings anti-apocalyptic as they flow from that 
sense of human agency which is also more prosaic, more ordinary, more banal, more 
pragmatic, more concerned with bread and butter, with the sports pages, with clothes 
that have been outgrown, with daily chores, and with the frequently dull and 
mundane laws of state.  
 Grosbard, in the context of his psychoanalysis of Israel’s current distress, gives a 
sense of how difficult the task of attending to that deeper ecumenism might be. “The 
problem,” he writes, 
is difficult because there is no deeper insult to one religion than recognizing the 
existence of the other. Religions have not compromised with each other in 
human history. God is by definition one and mine, and there is no compromise 
on that. There is nothing as total as religion, which allows, by definition, only a 
 
8 Marc Ellis, “The 11th Commandment” (Address presented to the American Muslims for Jerusalem 
6th Annual Convention, Santa Clara, California, 17 May 2003). Marc Ellis dubs the “11th 
Commandment”: “Thou shalt be silent in the presence of Palestinian suffering.” 
9 Ofer Grosbard, Israel on the Couch: The Psychology of the Peace Process (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 2003) at 6. 
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fight to the death with other religions. One God has never been tolerant of other 
gods.10  
Add to this the very deep distaste sometims displayed by secularism for religious 
thought and behavior and the ecumenical mindset begins to appear like a logically 
impossible puzzle. Anti-apocalyptic stirrings would need to be open, indeed, to an 
almost impossibly unchartable landscape. An anti-apocalyptic movement in the 
current climate of world affairs would need to be open first of all to a dialogue 
between the excluded middles of monotheistic religions (paradoxically each vying to 
exclude the other while all hearkening to the same singular God). But given the 
history and presence of Enlightenment and humanist values, it would also need to be 
attentive to the by now entrenched secularism that is both rooted in the silence of God 
and self-consciously oblivious and nonchalant to the very question of his existence.  
 This paper on cartography and law (and by silent implication justice) is an 
attempt to anticipate that landscape—the stones that have been laid to build the world 
that awaits an alert and intrepid revelation.11 This paper is a prologue to an 
examination of mixed legal jurisdictions, in the Israeli context. In starting with 
cartography and the relation of maps to law, it seeks to lay the ground for a 
reconceptualization of what mixed legal jurisdictions are about in general—or have 
the potential to be. As a paper that is more preoccupied with mixed legal traditions 
than the Middle East, it starts from what may seem a peculiar place. It starts with a 
discussion of another unofficially mixed legal tradition—that of Canadian Aboriginal 
common law.  
 It is an extrapolation of a discussion about mixed law arising originally on 
territory that seems territorially and historically remote to the Middle East, but very 
present and contemporary to those who are living within it. This paper on mixed law 
uses Richard White’s treatment of the legal middle ground that arose between 
European settlers and the Aboriginal nations that thrived in the Great Lakes region of 
North America as a starting point for analysis. In the spirit of a larger understanding 
of ecumene, or, as Herodotus calls it, the entire known world of culture that 
potentially might be organized, I have extended its vision from the Great Lakes 
region of Canada to the remote Mount Moriah. T is paper is about the various uses of 
cartography, law, and nation-building, and about the deepest sense of nation to which 
we might all be beholden. As law is also a more humble and less prophetic profession 
than theology, this paper is a first step in a way to conceive of how the mundane 
world of law—the technical and tedious world of contracts and delicts and 
matrimonial regimes—might anticipate a bolder kind of cartography than that which 
has been hooked up to empire for the last several generations. 
 
10 Supra note 9 at 103. 
11 Surely it is a revelation of things that have lways been there and have always been known. 
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II. The Middle Ground 
 The ripples of history and culture spreading out from Mount Moriah have been 
washing up around the world for millennia now and, as Richard White intimates, 
washing back again and intermingling with other pasts. This is an old history. And it 
was already an old, old overlapping of stories when it washed up on the shores of 
North America—the “New World”—half a millennia ago. Christianity had been 
entrenched in the Roman Empire by Constantine. Religion had then been comfortably 
wed to empire for 350 years prior to Justinian’s codification of civil law in 536 AD. 
By the time that Jacques Cartier sailed up the Saint Lawrence River in 1534, 
Justinian’s code had been revived, glossed, rescripted, humanized, and naturalized 
over and over again. The Catholic concern that the Empire be Holy and that holiness 
stand as a challenge to secular power had already been embodied in the prototype of a 
canonical code and entrenched in ecclesiastical courts all over Europe. Jerusalem had 
already fallen to the European crusaders and been restored 88 years later to the 
Muslim form of cohabitation with the Jews in the Holy City when Europeans came to 
the shores of the Great Lakes, carrying with them a mission to spill the history of 
Mount Moriah into the history of the New World.  
 Part of the mission to the New World was to bring the history of the Holy Land to 
the Indians, just as the Crusade intended to bring Christian domination to Jerusalem 
in 1099. The mission in the New World, however, was implemented on terrain where 
Europeans were originally a fragile minority, far from the reinforcements of their own 
shore, and Aboriginal nations were far from historyless blank slates. The mission was 
qualified by the compromises it had to make to arrive at a mutual understanding with 
the Aboriginals. The Aboriginal nations that the Europeans encountered had their 
own, developed understandings of the spiritual world.  
 In those early encounters between the Frnch and the Aboriginal nations that 
lived further up the Saint Lawrence River in the Great Lakes region of North America 
during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the religion of the Holy Land was 
not the only thing that figured in the relations between the two groups of peoples. The 
Jesuits following in the footsteps of the original traders and explorers, looking for 
souls to convert, would have carried one complex aspect of an alternate culture and 
history. In their originally awkward discussions with the Aboriginals on spiritual 
matters, they would have encountered on the ground the inescapable fact that the 
spiritual understandings of the Aboriginals were similarly just one, complex aspect of 
an elaborate alternative culture and history.  
 White documents how the Algonquian peoples appropriated Christian doctrine, 
converting the Christian God into “The Great Manitou” more than (or as much as) 
being themselves converted to Christianity.12 White is also clear that discussions 
about Christianity were themselves but one aspect of the multiplex interactions 
 
12 Richard White, The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 
1650-1815 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) at 26. 
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between the peoples, not even the predominant one. As White points out, “The Jesuit 
mission was, at best, a secondary attraction. To argue that either this mission or the 
later fort and mission at Michilimackinac led the Indians to settle the area is like 
arguing that people go to airports to be solicited by religious zealots and only 
incidentally to catch airplanes.”13 The Holy Land has figured for centuries, then, in 
the distribution area of Toronto’s Globe and Mail. But Richard White’s far greater 
theoretical point (and the one that I want to focus on for the purposes of this paper) is 
intimated in the conversion of the Christian God into the “Great Manitou” by the 
Algonquian peoples and the many other exchanges and encounters that surrounded 
that conversion.  
 The focus of White’s work, and the ultimate focus of this article, is on the 
elaborate and multiple ways that people incorporate aspects of the other’s world view, 
normalizing them in the process, in order to be able to understand and be understood. 
Jurisdictions that are made up, formally or informally, of mixed legal traditions are 
built upon this subtle, often unconscious, incorporation of the originally unfamiliar. 
These mutual incorporations become th foundation for shared understandings of 
injustice upon which the elaborations in law re built. Incorporating the other’s grief, 
as the opportunity (too occasionally) arises b tween Aboriginal nations and Canadian 
society, can lead to laws—common law, treaty, and statute—that build upon those 
intimate details. 
 Even when sensitivity to the other’s presence amounts to a self-conscious 
rejection of all that the other stands for, that self-consciousness manifests the kind of 
intimate understanding of the details of the other’s life that characterizes only the 
most familiar of strangers—familiar strangers on a par with alienated couples who 
cannot divorce; or couples who, though divorced, cannot separate for any number of 
reasons (psychological as well as parental) and for whom the relationship to the other 
is one of “divorce till death do us part.” Just as profoundly alienated couples know 
better than anyone else the uniquely grating details of the other’s physicality, a fair 
amount of the details of the other’s presence in the world needs to be incorporated 
even to sustain animosity. 
 It is this mutual understanding that I want to focus on for this prolegomenon to 
mixed legal traditions built upon a middle ground of mutual history. The alternative 
cartographies of that mutual understanding, and the alternative legal traditions that 
have the potential to arise from the fragile p ace of mutual recognition at its core, may 
take a determined mindset to map out. Elaborating the gaps and deficiencies in 
current representations of the territory of the possible—making explicit the partiality 
of contemporary maps and legal sensibilities—may need to suffice for now. It is here 
that insights into the anatomy of other middle grounds, like the fleeting one that 
White captured, may prove useful. 
 
13 Ibid. at 23. 
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 The larger theme that White works through a wealth of minute historical details 
(like the particular name given to the Algonquian version of the God of Abraham) 
relates to the ways that different peoples interact with each other and forge a kind of 
middle ground out of the understandings that emerge from their interactions. If the 
Algonquian understanding of manitous—an other-than-human person capable of 
taking manifold physical forms—offended Jesuit spiritual understandings, in their 
endeavors to 
convert Algonquians by attacking native beliefs, they, for tactical reasons, often 
themselves accepted native premises. The Jesuits ridiculed the manitous, but 
they did so in Algonquian terms. ... Success in war, success in the hunt, survival 
after falling through the ice, all ... causes of events in the Algonquian world 
only meant that heads of animals once offered to the manitous at feasts were 
now offered to Christ.”14  
The conversion of the Christian God into the “Great Manitou” by the Algonquian 
peoples was mirrored by an importation of manitous into Christian theology.  
 White’s larger theoretical point—and the one that I want now to import back to 
the context of Mount Moriah and its fractured ecumene—is that a negotiated middle 
ground emerged out of the originally strange-making encounters between each 
people. Although originally “the French reduced Indian religion to devil worship and 
witchcraft” and although the “Algonquians, for their part, thought of the first 
Europeans as manitous,” and although “on both sides, new people were crammed into 
existing categories in a mechanical way,” eventually, out of tactic and negotiation, out 
of the ranges of practical need to understand and be understood, and out of the 
multiple acts of cultural translation that were incorporated into each language, a 
common culture of understanding emerged. The boundaries of each world melted into 
the other, and the existing categories expanded and dissolved their hard mechanical 
edges. Each people had to deal with others who did not originally share “their values 
nor their assumptions about the appropriate way of accomplishing tasks. They had to 
arrive at some common conception of suitable ways of acting; they had to create ... a 
middle ground.”15 Though the original stages of arriving at mutual understandings of 
the other involved stark and two-dimensional depictions, the regular, pedestrian, 
practical encounters between individuals from each group generated a tacit 
background place which thickened into a bedrock of common understandings—an 
intercultural resource from which to draw both intercultural discernment and moral 
judgment.  
 Although this middle ground (about which White is spectacularly elaborate in its 
details) had explicit and articulate formal moments and agreements that could be 
drawn upon for the settlement of misunderstandings and disputes, it operated at 
another distinct level: the level of plodding, everyday life. Some subsequent writers 
on the middle ground identify the role of f rce as a component running through the 
 
14 Ibid. at 26 [emphasis added]. 
15 Ibid. at 50. 
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middle ground. That is, they contemplate the thesis that force and justice may not be 
mutually exclusive.16 White himself, however, notes that “the middle ground 
depended on the inability of both sides to gain their ends through force.”17 The middle 
ground grew as an alternative to force, out f he felt necessity to assimilate enough 
of the other’s reasoning to put it to their own purposes.  
 Intercultural laws, agreements, and procedures may be construed as one of the 
formal levels through which a middle ground emerged, governing for example 
conjugal relations between both groups, or c nflicts around cross-cultural assaults 
and murders. These institutions, instruments, and laws were not the only locus for the 
emergence of the law of the middle ground. In addition to these “high law” 
formulations, White and subsequent writers have also begun to construe Aboriginal 
common law, the distinct body of law that has acquired increasing formal recognition 
in the Canadian constitution and courts, a  a feature of ongoing pedestrian and 
practical encounters, and the pragmatic efforts to assimilate enough of the other’s 
legal sensibility to arrive at a common legal purpose.  
 The legal order that emerged on that middle ground was not the formal structure 
of one order simply imposed by the dominant population on the other and gradually 
adopted through greater and greater acts of capitulation to the more dominant group. 
On the contrary, the now relatively entrenched resource of Canadian Aboriginal 
common law grew out of the ongoing relations, practical compromises and 
incorporations that emerged from the minutiae of daily encounters. This middle 
ground, however—this common law—has become a cultural resource that each group 
draws upon as though drawing on their own distinctive past. The civilian and 
common law legal sensibilities that were originally imported to Canada, already 
heavily infused with the contributions of local cultures from around Europe and the 
Middle East, became something more and different as they developed through the 
course of their own history in the Great Lakes region—and likewise for the 
Algonquian legal sensibility that coursed through the same shared river of history.  
 One of the things that is striking about this account for Mount Moriah is that 
White lays out the development of a middle ground as a progression of stages. This 
progressive account is perhaps inevitable in light of the punctual moments of 
encounter between Aboriginal and European populations—punctual in the sense that 
contact began at a now identifiable time and place, as opposed to the millennia of 
intermingling of the peoples of Europe and the Middle East. In the North American 
context, relations between European settlers and Aboriginal populations would seem 
to progress naturally from that set of stark o iginal encounters. The original stage—a 
primitive one, White might say—is one where “On both sides, new people were 
crammed into existing categories in a mechanical way.”18 Fully formed world views 
 
16 See e.g. Jeremy Webber, “Relations of Force and Relations of Justice: The Emergence of 
Normative Community Between Colonists and Aboriginal Peoples” (1995) 33 Osgoode Hall L.J. 623. 
17 Supra note 12 at 52. 
18 White, supra note 12 at 51. 
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had to place startling new understandings into an intractably familiar framework. 
From those early, awkward attempts at dealing with the other, and out of a 
burgeoning recognition that raw violence would ultimately incapacitate both sides 
from gaining their ends on the land, an intercultural sensibility emerged. A common 
understanding of what “Lord God Our Savior/The Great Manitou” meant could 
eventually allow either word to be used in a theological discussion between 
individuals from either group.  
 The paradox for this paper—and one that undermines White’s assumption that 
the middle ground emerged in progressive stages—is that the Great Manitou of 
Mount Moriah has been fractured (in the Holy Land itself) into the intractably 
familiar mechanical categories of one very local group or its other intimately local 
neighbor, with apparently no middle ground between the two—a middle ground that 
has splintered into a powder keg ceaselessly scanned by the unsleeping eyes of 280 
cameras. It is this living example of the dissolution of a deeply sedimented and 
thickened middle ground that makes Mount Moriah such a striking counterpoint to 
the progressive account offered by White. The progression in the ‘new world’ seemed 
to move from belligerent ignorance to increasingly enlightened (though always 
precarious and fraught) mutual recognition. By contrast, in the old world, it seems to 
have deteriorated from intimate, even fraternal, familiarity to willful insensitivity. 
III. The Swollen Details of the Mundane 
 White underlines the point that the middle ground between the Aboriginal nations 
and European settlers of the Great Lakes region in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries did not exist only in the explicit, formal terms of treaties and diplomatic 
relations and through articulated institutions and rules (though for historians, the 
latter terrain would be easiest to uncover and chart out). There was another level on 
which this middle ground emerged which was just as commonly frequented, if not 
more so, by both peoples. This was the middle ground of everyday life.19 Indeed, that 
there were trading encounters and regular negotiations around the value of goods; that 
there were conjugal relations between the first waves of European traders and 
Aboriginal women (the European traders were almost exclusively male); that there 
were flare-ups of violence between the groups—these kinds of pedestrian encounters 
and exchanges and petty familiarities in many ways gave the formal middle ground 
its common sense and solidity, its legitimacy. These small details of a facial 
expression here, a voice raised in anger there, a way of holding back—originally 
peculiar and unexpected but then, after years of knowing the other and how the 
members of their group hold back in certain encounters but not in others—these are 
the thick history of details, too incomprehensibly massive to carry in a single memory 
or in a single law, that each group subsequently draws upon to set the more 
unbudging understanding that a particular law is fair or a particular court ruling 
unjust. 
 
19 Ibid. at 53. 
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 These are the kinds of “swollen details” of the subtle and unwritten cultural texts 
that anthropologists have attempted to excavate in their ethnographic inquiries. I have 
borrowed the phrase from Edward Lane’s depiction of his objective in An Account of 
the Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians: “to make Egypt and the 
Egyptians totally visible, to keep nothing hidden from his reader, to deliver the 
Egyptians without depth, in swollen detail.”20  
 Ammiel Alcalay21 cites this passage in reference to Edward Said’s discomfort 
with the objectifying and ultimately appropriative way that the West “studied” other 
peoples: by contorting human comity in order to view “the Orient as spectacle, as 
tableau vivant.”22 I am aware of the suspect nature of attempting to grasp the other 
through the technologies of othering, but for the moment want to advocate for the 
revelatory potential of thick description for understanding both self and other. These 
are often the kinds of minute details that constitute our internal struggles to grasp 
ourselves through the same kind of swollen details that make up a human life. It is 
this tension between depicting reality and selectively describing it so as to appropriate 
it (intellectually and otherwise) that also characterizes the cartographic enterprise. 
When this tension is linked through cartography to law by the intermediate device of 
jurisdiction, it is the tension that distinguishes a community of those legitimately 
bound by law from an empire of law that allows one vision to predominate and 
thereby dominate. The swollen detail of the middle ground would be closer to 
providing a map of community than the more recently familiar maps of empire. That 
kind of intimate detail is closer to the ground upon which intercommunal legitimacy 
and law are built.  
 In some ways, this swollen detail about the middle ground is well known in the 
Middle East. It is so deep and pregnant with both unwritten and written detail that it 
seems like a far more arduous independent labour to forget it rather than to remember 
it. It seems as though it would take an extraordinary effort to arrive at the point where 
the world splits in two at the excluded middle and things line up on one side or 
another, all of the complex details of history lined up like iron filings around two 
polarized magnets.  
 As Richard White has laid out the kinds of pedestrian intercommunal exchanges 
that made up the middle ground between Aboriginal nations and European settlers—
and that makes up the middle ground of Aboriginal common law that is drawn upon 
by the Canadian Supreme Court in its rulings on a considerable range of Aboriginal 
rights—, so a deep history attests to the middle ground of pedestrian encounters in the 
Middle East. This middle ground is sometimes inchoate and unselfconscious in the 
superabundance of texts, maps, images, shared histories, languages, and ways of 
 
20 Edward William Lane, An Account of the Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians 
(London: Charles Wright, 1842), cited in Alcalay, infra note 21 at 65. 
21 Ammiel Alcalay, After Jews and Arabs: Remaking Levantine Culture (Minneapolis: University of 
Minneapolis Press, 1993) at 65.  
22 Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage Books, 1944) at 158-62, cited in Alcalay, ibid. at 65. 
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being in the presence of the other. On occasion, it is formalized in treaties and 
agreements and ways of formulating law and in constraints on judicial decisions.23 On 
occasion, it is made explicit in accounts such as Alcalay’s.  
 Alcalay’s book, After Jews and Arabs,24 depicts in detail the millennia of texts 
and encounters that attest to a kind of overlapping, dense familiarity between Mizrahi 
Jews (Jews indigenous to the Middle East and its surroundings prior to the creation of 
Israel) and their Muslim neighbours. He details precisely the kinds of minute and 
subtle familiarity that gave birth to the middle ground of shared forms of life and 
agreement in a manner similar to Great Lakes region of North America. He also 
occasionally links this middle ground of everyday life, in his scrupulous wanderings 
through the literature and poetry of the Middle East over centuries and centuries, to 
the law. For example, he cites the dense historical familiarity between Tunisian Jews 
and Muslims from an account by Abraham Udovitch and Lucette Valensi, tangentially 
transcribed into an unwritten legal middle ground: 
There is no single generalization or rule which could serve to characterize the 
whole range of social and economic contacts between Jerban Jews and Jerban 
Muslims. Each circumstance between them has its own movable boundaries in 
which elements of friendship and hostility, confidence and suspicion, 
collaboration and competition are intermingled in varying proportions. In the 
market, the notion which governs commerce between Jews and Muslims is that 
of haqq al-yahud, a concept which has many meanings and uses, but which 
translated literally means ‘the law, the justice, the honesty of the Jews. ...’ It is 
not surprising to find this quality invoked by the Jews themselves. But it is also 
invoked by Muslims as a password to cut short bargaining or other negotiations 
concerning the price or quality of an object. Concluding a discussion with the 
invocation of haqq al-yahud is equivalent to giving an oath. The Jewish 
jeweller places his honesty, his reputation, his reliability on the line—that is, all 
the qualities which form the basis of his relationship with his clients. But, this is 
more than a personal engagement; it is, at the same time, that of the group to 
which the jeweler belongs. Beyond the single moral quality of honesty—
individual and collective—there is also the reference to respect for the law. Put 
in another way, since the ahl al-kitab [people of the book] are people of the law, 
one can deal with them.25 
This passage about mutual incorporation, with the peoples renamed and the history of 
overlapping communities less historically deep, could be lifted from Alcalay’s or 
 
23 The Israeli High Court of Justice, for example, in ruling on Israel’s separation barrier and 
invoking the proportionality test that weighed Israeli s curity interests against the human rights of 
the occupied Palestinians, was aware of constraints imposed by the very familiar humanity of the 
people displaced and traumatized—more familiar than most of those interested international 
observers who read the decision, disquieted by a perceived lack of appropriate balancing (Beit 
Sourik Village Council v. The Government of Israel (30 June 2004), 2056/04 (Israel H.C.J.) at paras. 
59-61.  
24 Supra note 21. 
25 Abraham L. Udovitch & Lucette Valensi, The Last Arab Jews: The Communities of Jerba, Tunisia 
(New York: Harwood Academic, 1984) at 117, cited in Alcalay, supra note 21 at 21. 
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Udovitch’s book and pasted into White’s account of the emergence of the middle 
ground between Europeans and settlers that eventually gave rise to the body of 
Aboriginal common law in Canadian law. Here too are the complex pedestrian 
negotiations bathed in friendship and hostility, confidence and suspicion, 
collaboration and competition.  
 These small marketplace and domestic epics that speak to the heart of Middle 
Eastern history can be reproduced effectively ad infinitem, not only all along the 
Maghrebi coast but also throughout the Middle East and beyond—banal stories of 
ordinary people from places of no significant geo raphical distinction that are in fact 
part of a larger exemplary and heroic (or “prophetic” if one is so inclined) tale.  
 It’s not as though these pedestrian contribu ions to a middle ground between Jews 
and Muslims were places of sublime equality, with exchanges characterized by a 
perpetual unblemished equity. Far from it, though the hierarchies of asymmetry were 
often subtle. As with the world that White depicts, there were endless shifts in power 
relations between groups, sometimes cataclysmic. Though people lived and traded 
and conversed within the same communities, they also would have “made ... effort[s] 
to distinguish themselves from ... other[s] without thereby separating.”26 Joëlle 
Bahloul provides an evocative rendering of this kind of subtle, contained world of 
hierarchical distinctions (in this case spatially hierarchized) in her ethnography of a 
Jewish-Muslim household in colonial Algeria between 1937 and 1962.27 As she notes:  
Things and people were not in fact blended in this house, even though 
memories seem to present them as such. ... As we have seen, a tenuous but 
complex social distinction was inscribed in the house’s spatial organization. 
Socioeconomic differences between resid nts of the ground floor and those of 
the upper floor were tacitly recognized. To be downstairs around the courtyard 
meant being on the lower rungs of the social ladder. ... Needless to say, these 
differences in status overlapped with ethnic and religious differences: most 
Jewish families lived on the upper floor and all the Muslims below. And 
although they [the interlocutors of Bahloul’s ethnography] say that they lived in 
happy cohesion, these two groups were significantly differentiated on a daily 
basis.28 
Of course, for the real house to hold together, there had to be an upper floor and a 
lower floor, the upper depending on the lower for structural support. The upper floor 
could not have floated in air, as the top half of an Algerian household in the 1930s, 
without its lower part, with the very particular details that made up the architectural 
vernacular of Algeria. The figurative house or community or society, at least the 
particular historical one that has the configuration and character specific to Algeria, 
also had uppers and lowers. And within these, there seemed an endless regression of 
 
26 Joëlle Bahloul, The Architecture of Memory: A Jewish-Muslim Household in Colonial Algeria, 
1937-1963, trans. by Catherine du Peloux Ménagé (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) at 
40. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. at 40. 
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further distinctions, more refined uppers and lowers which distinguished those, for 
example, who slept on the bed and those who slept on the floor upon the upper level. 
Articulating the significance of these distinctions were all manner of refinements 
from near and far, for example:  
At the very bottom of this hierarchy the discourse of memory placed those who 
had to sleep curled up on the floor. In colonial Algeria this sleeping position 
may have denoted a nomadic way of life and thus embodied the absolute 
opposite of a European lifestyle and the impossibility of emancipation.29  
Within these structured asymmetries, individuals both discovered and distinguished 
their idiosyncratic characters, as did groups.  
 Bahloul’s remembered household in which Jews and Muslims lived together 
(albeit within a structure of minutely subtle asymmetrical tensions) came to an end 
with the Algerian War of Independence, and then definitively tumbled with Israel’s 
Six Day War in 1967 when the remaining Jews fled the collapse of communal 
relations to Europe or to Israel. Bahlou ’s work (as with Alcalay’s literary 
archaeology of Levantine culture) requires, now, a recollection of the past—an active 
pursuit of memories (literary or oral) of a time and place where the other was not only 
intimately known, but could draw forth acts of tenderness and could call upon subtle 
mutual recognitions. Works like Bahloul’s seek to recover memories of those middle 
spaces where Jews and Muslims may recall how, despite distinctions, they were not 
separate—to bring back those ordinary moments of domestic interaction: “the odour 
of baking bread, the odour of cooking, and the small favours women exchanged every 
day. It was the children who brought the missing egg or the half pound of butter 
forgotten in the previous day’s shopping”30—, a reciprocity that was so elaborate that 
one of the Jewish members of an Algerian household, now dispersed to France, “does 
not hesitate to say that, had there been a Nazi invasion from Tunisia, the Arabs would 
have hidden the Jews whereas Frenchmen would gladly have handed them over.”31 
 Although the history of the region contains a deep intercultural reservoir of these 
elaborate memories of reciprocity, each subsequent generation appears capable of 
removing itself from this middle ground of collective memory and comity. Just as 
recollection can hinge on impossibly minute details like an odour or a tone of voice, 
the current shared ground is also capable of being seized by an obsessive hair-trigger 
awareness of every move of the other, every facial expression and glance, every turn 
of phrase and modulation of voice. The shared ground has never really ceased being 
part of a common intercultural past, even though that space is dominated by just as 
elaborate distinctions whose very purpose i  to separate. Confronted by that 
contemporary drive for distinction, it must bepainful and dangerous to recollect such 
a past—to compromise the felt necessity of its separateness. 
 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. at 83. 
31 Ibid. at 90. 
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 And yet, if recollection might be drawn upon in the service of a greater legal 
ecumenism (of which these pedestrian and domestic details constitute articles of faith 
and rules of procedure), it might also map out the sorry journey from an historical 
intercultural middle ground that each were constrained (and moved) to draw upon as 
part of their own cultural reservoir, to the shared space of empire that now dominates 
the landscape. The rest of this paper will look at a small sample of the many maps of 
the area, and how they have transformed distinctions that don’t necessarily lead to 
separateness into completely segregated worlds vying for ultimate and obliterative 
distinctions between self and other.  
IV. Logical Minimalizations 
 The more or less stable categories of mixed law that Stephen Goldstein comments 
upon as the Israel reporter in Vernon Palmer’s survey of mixed jurisdictions provides 
somewhat of a counterpoint to the idea of a legal middle ground that I am developing 
in this paper.32 Perhaps inevitably (and no doubt for obvious reasons), the mixed 
jurisdiction of Israel is construed as a discrete product of highly contained historical 
events arising out of a precipitous break with a local past—a past which, in 
Goldstein’s formalist discussion of what is present now, has no place. Goldstein’s 
report reads as though Israeli law came to birth in a world whose prior order had no 
bearing, rather than coming to birth in a world that was already ordered. There is no 
hint in his account of millennia of a routine and banal common sense shared by the 
very people that now continue to inhabit the Middle East, poised in starkly 
oppositional stances. Hence Goldstein notes very briefly that Ottoman Turkish law 
was replaced by English law in the period of the British Mandate over Palestine 
(1920).33 From this almost erra nova description of the legal past, common law and 
civil law began to mix with each other. The common law of the Mandate was overlaid 
by the influence of the first generation of the legal elite, both during and after the 
Holocaust, and in the years following the founding of the state of Israel in 1948. 
Leading jurists on the highest courts, in ministries of justice, and in the leading 
faculties of law, fled the devastation of anti-Semitic Europe bringing with them the 
continental legal tradition and giving private law in Israel its civil law overlay. As a 
result, in both substantive and procedural private law, the influence of both secular 
European traditions can be seen alongside a limited range of official religious law.34  
 Israel is a classic mixed or mixing legal jurisdiction on this description and from 
one point of view, no fault can be found in the ways things are laid out. The private 
law of Israel must depict the law of the state. The state came into being in 1948. It 
would appear to be picayune and academic (if not bombastic) to refer to continuities 
 
32 Stephen Goldstein, “Israel” in Vernon Valentine Palmer, ed., Mixed Jurisdictions Worldwide: The 
Third Legal Family (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
33 Ibid. at 449. 
34 Talmudic, Islamic, Druze, and Christian customs are all present in Israeli law of marriage and 
divorce. 
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and discontinuities beyond those borders. And yet those continuities and 
discontinuities do not go away with the precipitous creation of the state—just as they 
do not for any state. Formalist, statist descriptions of law are just as thin in the Middle 
East as they are elsewhere. 
 In light of massive transformations in both common law and civil law in the 
nineteenth century (each transformation attendant upon massive transformations in 
the nature of state, jurisdiction, and law), it is hard now to contemplate anywhere the 
deep and complex histories of the traditions of common law and civil law and the 
ways that each state-based tradition intermingled with local customary law. Prior to 
the rationalizations of law in the nineteenth century, however, local law figured much 
more prominently in the substantive and procedural structures of official law in 
England and on the continent. Though familiar prior to the Judicature Acts in England 
and prior to the codification of the European ius commune on the continent, these 
local legal sensibilities seem to have nothing to do with law as we know it today. It 
might seem anomalous and particular to Aboriginal law in Canada that a legal 
academic could, but a generation ago, draw on a mere handful of written cases 
delivered over the centuries on the topics of Aboriginal rights and Aboriginal title. It 
might also seem peculiar to that particular body of law that the courts (facing that 
paucity of written Aboriginal common law) drew retrospectively upon an unwritten 
body of common law—a middle ground of negotiated and unspoken arrangements 
that had been emerging over centuries of encounters between Europeans and 
Aboriginal nations. The body of Aboriginal common law seems to be a legal outlier, 
as remote from law as the Great Manitou might be from orthodox Christian dogma.  
 Each of the common law and civil law traditions, however, that make up the bulk 
of the state law of Israel in Goldstein’s account have only a very thin history. These 
traditions would be nearly unrecognizable to the generations upon generations of pre-
nineteenth-century peoples that drew upon something more akin to a middle ground 
of unformalized, unpositivized, habits of thought and life. Prior to Napoleon’s 
codification of civil law in France, for example, the civil law permeating continental 
legal thinking—largely academic—was based on the permutations of Gaius’ index to 
Justinian’s sixth-century codification of Roman law, and was drawn upon by the 
parliaments principally as persuasive authority or to fill in gaps in customary 
understanding within local legal orders. In common law, the jury played an analogous 
role in bringing together the common sense of the hills and dales of England and the 
procedural structure of the ambulant common law courts. The nineteenth-century 
rationalization of law greatly centralized jurisdictions and also contributed 
considerably to the consolidation of empire. 
 A similar departure from fidelity to the legal common sense of the locale in 
favour of the imposition of a more remote and authoritative vision can be seen in the 
Great Lakes region of North America. White’s progression over the course of his 
exactingly detailed account passes from primitive states of cartoonish distinctions 
(“on both sides, new people ... crammed into existing categories in a mechanical 
way”) to a quite deeply incorporated middle ground which consisted in the 
acceptance and transformation of another people’s customs. Finally, at the conclusion  
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of his book, White notes that the middle ground eventually fell apart, dying in bits 
and pieces. The book finishes with a note reminding us of Said’s critical depiction of 
how Orientalism portrays the other (“Orient as spectacle, as tableau vivant”), and 
with Trowbridge studying the Aboriginal prophet Tenskwatawa,  
preserving him and his people against the day they would disappear. From 
creators of the middle ground, from people who strove to maintain the 
necessary understanding of a common world, the Algonquians had become 
objects of study in a world of white learning.35  
 This movement from oppositional innocence, to middle ground, to obliteration 
seems to be on its head in the Middle East, with the deep intercultural reservoir of the 
Levantine middle ground having been polarized beyond recognition. If the 
progression is understood to lack inevitability, there are prospects that the 
unambiguously raw violence of the moment could swell again to the familiar swollen 
details of mutual understanding, in recognition that the state is the country of the 
people living in it, rather than some ever-expanding “home” for one group or the 
other.36 This would also involve recognizing state law as the law of the people living 
in it, rather than the national home for legal systems pulled from European and 
American metropoli. This is not a particularly utopian vision. Rather it is its 
antithesis: a pragmatic understanding that Mount Moriah is just a place, ordinary and 
mundane. This more pragmatic harnessing of contemporary and historical realities 
would be one, as Alcalay suggests, “in which a truer rapprochement between Israelis 
and Palestinians and the Levantine and Arab worlds could turn a potential climate 
into an actual one, reconnect old and familiar routes and realign the cultural 
constellations of the region.”37 
 An aspect of this endeavor to rescue a far deeper lingua franca of the country and 
region would be, as John Cage remarked about the function of art, “to preserve it 
from all the logical minimalizations that we are at each instant tempted to apply to the 
flux of events.”38 Both law and cartography are sublimely logical in their 
minimalizations, selectively oblivious to the flux of events and the process that is the 
world we live in. The task of contrasting a terrain and architecture of the legal process 
which is the world of the Levantine with the logical minimalizations that are 
abbreviated further in Goldstein’s overview of the law of Israel is itself a daunting 
enterprise, and one which I am postponing for later work. For the rest of this paper, I 
want to examine the minimalizations of cartography, in general, and in the region, 
and their relationship to the minimalizations of legal jurisdiction of Israel/Palestine. 
 
35 Supra note 12 at 522. 
36 Paraphrase of Ammiel Alcalay, “The Geography of Time” (1992) 31 Michigan Quarterly Review 
498 at 505 [Alcalay, “Geography of Time”]. 
37 Ibid. at 505. 
38 Quoted in ibid. at 514. 
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V. The Maps that Are Not Made 
 As I have intimated the prospects of a Levantine Israel—country of the people 
living in it, rather than some ever-expanding “home” for one group or the other39—, 
one would imagine that there might already exist maps of Israel that represent the 
terrain of community rather than the jurisd ction of empire. There are all manner of 
artistic and political movements that join the two peoples (and more) together. To 
give one small example, Nasser Al-Taee writes of the fusion of Arab and Jewish 
musical styles, performances, and lyrics in his article “Voices of Peace and the 
Legacy of Reconciliation.”40 Although this musical interpenetration need not be 
juxtaposed on top of something as set and durable as land, it borrows from settled 
musical conventions and the real-world limitations of voices and instruments in order 
to build its vision. One would think that it would be easy to translate this 
understanding into cartographic terms, borrowing from cartographic traditions 
respectively embedded in ways of relating to land and direction, transposing a 
middle-ground sensibility onto a commonly understood topography. As the critical 
cartographer J.B. Harley points out, however, “The social history of maps, unlike that 
of literature, art, or music, appears to have few genuinely popular, alternative, or 
subversive modes of expression. Maps are preeminently a language of power, not of 
protest.”41 Mapping a Holy Land, then—one that shows all the routes, alleyways and 
households of pedestrian and domestic intermingling, exchange, and cross-
pollination—would seem to be a desperately utopian exercise; one that might unfold 
within yearnings, confined to the imagination, but not within “real” space.  
 In fact, such maps of the Holy Land have been far from uncommon. As Naftali 
Kadmon indicates, “Israel does not constitute the subject of the oldest known maps ... 
[b]ut the Holy Land undoubtedly boasts the longest unbroken chain of graphic 
representations in the world.”42 In the history of cartography, Jerusalem is perhaps the 
most mapped city in the world. From the medieval period onwards, a significant 
number of those maps of Jerusalem were drawn up with no visit to the actual land. As 
a result, the mapping of this of-the-world/otherworldly space resulted in the 
development of a whole series of practices, across a range of communities and 
cultures and religions in the European and Middle Eastern world. Those practices 
were elaborated upon the foundation of the maps, and vice versa. In this sense, both 
 
39 Ibid. at 505. 
40 Nasser Al-Taee, “Voices of Peace and the Legacy of Reconciliation: Popular Music, Nationalism, 
and the Quest for Peace in the Middle East” (2002) 21 Popular Music 41. 
41 J.B. Harley, The New Nature of Maps: Essays in the History of Cartography, ed. by Paul Laxton 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001) at 79. 
42 Naftali Kadmon, “The Holy Land in Maps: From Stone Mosaic to Satellite Image” in Ariel 
Tishby, ed., Holy Land in Maps (Jerusalem: The Israel Museum, 2001) [Tishby, Holy Land in Maps] 
at 13. 
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the complex practices and the maps shared a relative location in a common world 
view and it is upon this foundation that modern cartography was built.43  
 As a result of the centrality of the location in both monotheistic religions and 
world politics, the “Holy Land”44 has been criss-crossed by pilgrims and travelers, 
expeditions and surveyors, for thousands and thousands of years. One can see from 
the maps produced following those journeys that maps always share relative location, 
however locale and space is conceived. And they always seek to orient a map-reader 
to the shared intellectual space of the cartographer.45 Rehav Rubin writes that  
[m]ost of the ancient maps were not intended to guide travelers or to serve any 
other practical purpose. They were regarded rather as a means of 
communication, transmitting information, viewpoints, ideas and, in the case of 
Jerusalem, conveying the sanctity of the cityand its centrality in the eyes of the 
faithful.46  
As I will argue with respect to the embedded cultural and political elements of 
modern map making—the world view and implicit morality of maps—, the desire to 
depict a bedrock central reference point of reality (to represent a world of virtually 
unchanging topographical permanence) is just as directive in modern “scientific” 
maps as it is to ancient religious maps. Modern maps too serve principally as a means 
of communication, of transmitting information, of conveying viewpoints and ideas. 
 As I will argue shortly, the legal traditions most familiar to the nineteenth- and 
twentieth-century imagination are built upon a notion of jurisdiction deeply wed to 
the episteme of accuracy—the universal scien e of measurement and order and the 
principle of classification and ordered tabulation.47 The common law and civil law 
traditions that Goldstein focuses on are wed both to the rise of the nation state and to 
the emergence of “modern” cartography. One can imagine that conceiving of an 
alternative cartography (perhaps one more self-conscious about its own cultural and 
historical contingency) might also lead to a reconception of law and the means by 
which is it conceived of as an answer to injustice. It has been suggested in 
cartography that “the map that is not made ... warrants as much attention as the map 
that is made.”48 The same suggestion should be made about law: that those legal 
sensibilities that are not recognized by orthodoxy warrant as much attention as those 
 
43 See e.g. the exquisite range of images in Tishby, Holy Land in Maps, ibid. This is one of many 
works written on the history of cartography in the Holy Land. 
44 The term “Holy Land” has been placed in quotations because place names are one of those 
contested aspects of cartography—particularly in the land I am addressing—to which I will return 
momentarily. 
45 See Arthur H. Robinson & Barbara Bartz Petchenik, The Nature of Maps: Essays toward 
Understanding Maps and Mapping (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976) at 4. 
46 Rehav Rubin, “From the Center of the World to Modern City: Maps of Jerusalem through the 
Ages” in Tishby, Holy Land in Maps, supra note 42 at 25. 
47 See Harley, supra note 41 at 98. 
48 Ibid. at 106.  
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that are; that law’s silence about multiple senses of injustice warrant as much 
attention as those that are recognized and remedied. 
VI. Names 
 Attending to the silences in maps is a project that has grabbed the attention of 
cartographers for several years now as one fac t of the struggle to understand the 
sources of authority of maps. J.B. Harley49 is perhaps the most prominent, if not the 
first, of these critical cartographers tounderline the essential requirement of a 
properly functional map: to lie about aspects of the reality therein represented, and to 
occlude as much as is revealed of the topographical landscape. These silences are 
reflected in the cartographic world of the North American middle ground between 
Aboriginal peoples and European settlers. In the early centuries of “discovery”, the 
French and English settlers busily drafted and redrafted maps of the region, 
supplanting French place names with English ones, and vice versa, as though they 
were planting flags of sovereignty. To assert through a toponym the predominance of 
one nation against all others required the French and English settlers to be silent 
about the history and presence of others occupying the same space. As between the 
European colonizers there was by then a sh red emerging practice of dividing the 
world into discrete Cartesian units, all equivalent, all geometrisizable. This shared 
conceptualization of space allowed for the ever-expansive mapping of the earth’s 
territory as one (conquerable) unit.  
 But now, even outside of the European certainty that the world could be mapped 
truly or falsely within a single, universal Euclidian space, and outside of the 
preoccupation with joining the mapping and naming of territory to acts of 
sovereignty, there is recognition that North American Aboriginal peoples had their 
own names for places, and that they had their own ways of organizing those names. 
There is also recognition that Aboriginal people had their own elaborate world views, 
territorial sensibilities, and frameworks for conceptualizing space. Law is linked to 
those territorial sensibilities in ways that are just being recognized in Canada.  
 So for example, Aboriginal toponymic maps serve as evidence of land use 
patterns, and hence constitute the basis for land claims settlements which are still 
being negotiated across Canada between Aboriginal nations and the Canadian 
government. These maps reflect forms of life and land usage that simply do not 
correspond to the industrializing, private pro erty model of generations of European 
settlers. Borders of sovereign land, for settlers, would be cadastrally and 
jurisdictionally fixed and unchanging except by acts of will or accession. This same 
territory was historically in flux for Aboriginal peoples. For example, for one period 
of their history the Inuit shifted their patterns of land use quatro-annually in response 
to the abundance and dearth cycles of the fox; in another period they modified their 
 
49 Ibid. 
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land use according to the seasonal shifts in the high water mark and modulations in 
the ice flows.50  
 The belief that there is just one spatiality by which all others must be assessed is 
now recognized in cartography as an ethnoce tric projection, and not only at the 
margins of the field.51 Although “the received wisdom is that ‘smaller, less developed 
societies have no need to map land ownership, tax assessment districts, the 
topography of tank attacks, sub-surface geology likely to contain oil, sewer lines, 
crime statistics, congressional districts, or any of the rest of the things we find 
ourselves compelled to map ... this does not mean that they don’t create in their heads 
dense multi-layered, fact-filled maps of the worlds they live in.’”52 The Aboriginal 
place name maps drawn up as both alternative representations of the world and as 
alternative ways to stake interests in Aboriginal land provide a sense of how partial 
and relative the European cartographic tradition has been. They intimate whole other 
ways of conceiving of the spatial world. And they illustrate how rhetorical some of 
Europe’s most “realistic” representations of space have been. This reflection also 
surely gives us pause with regard to how historically contingent and rhetorical our 
contemporary maps must be.  
 The toponymic silences of maps are a familiar feature of map making in the 
Middle East as well. The 2004 film Route 181: Fragments of a Journey in Palestine-
Israel, co-directed by the Israeli filmmaker Eyal Sivan and his Palestinian peer 
Michel Khleifi, provides narrative accounts of precisely that kind of obliteration of 
the other’s place in the world that can be found in countless maps of Israel produced 
from 1948 onwards.53 The title of the film refers to UN Resolution 181, which 
attempted to partition Palestine into an Israeli State and a Palestinian one in 1947—a 
prototypically modern and instantaneous cartographic creation of clear jurisdictions 
where no such clarity had existed before (or since, for that matter). The filmmakers 
interviewed Palestinian and Israeli people living along the 1947 partition line, thereby 
creating an oral history of the contemporary schism. Throughout their epic car 
journey along the line, Sivan and Khleifi routinely refer, in their discussions with 
interlocutors, to places on a map (which is enshrined on the dashboard of their car 
and reflected in the windshield as they proceed along the route). The filmmakers ask 
people, as they find themselves in the very places once named, if they have heard of 
the Arab town that used to exist underfoot or across the way. The towns have 
 
50 See Susan G. Drummond, Incorporating the Familiar: An Investigation into Legal Sensibilities in 
Nunavik (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1997) at 27-31. 
51 Part of the research that I carried out on Inuit legal sensibilities was based on the place name maps 
produced by McGill University geographer Ludger Müller-Wille. See Ludger Müller-Wille, “Place 
Names, Territoriality and Sovereignty: Inuit Perc ption of Space in Nunavik (Canadian Eastern 
Arctic)” Schweizerische Amerikanisten-Gesellschaft Bull. 53-54 (1989-90) 17. 
52 Daniel Dorling & David Fairbairn, Mapping: Ways of Representing the World (Essex: Longman, 
1997) at 71. 
53 Eyal Sivan & Michel Khleifi, Route 181: Fragments of a Journey in Palestine-Israel (Momento, 
2003). 
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vanished from both contemporary maps and, for the most part, from contemporary 
consciousness (and conscience).  
 The contemporary obliteration of place is by no means unique to the Israelis. The 
history of huge swathes of Europe in the 1930s-50s is also a history of the wilful 
obliteration of Jewish places and Jewish presence. I assisted my partner’s father in 
giving his testimony to the Holocaust Museum in Montreal in 2003, and one of the 
most painfully poignant moments in that recollection was when he briefly returned to 
his home in Poland from a Displaced Persons Camp in Berlin, looking for his 
mother’s grave. She had died, wrenched from him out of the blue, from septicemia 
when he was a twelve-year-old boy, several years prior to the moment that the bricks 
started going up around him in the Warsaw Ghetto. Upon his return to his city of 
origin, he found that the Poles had obliterated the cemetery in which she was buried. 
They had completely destroyed it. She had disappeared from his life when he was still 
a boy. When he returned as a deeply traumatized adult to his mother’s gravestone, the 
place where her body had rested had disappeared from the face of the earth. That 
Jewish cemetery would not exist on a contemporary Polish map of the place of his 
birth.  
 The contemporary focus on the “silences” in maps—on the peoples ignored or 
marginalized—is an attempt to promote social justice by belying the 
comprehensiveness of those maps which speak the language of power.  
 Attending to the silences contained in dominant maps would be essential for a 
redrafting of the middle ground. Just as is ues of contemporary sovereignty are 
beginning to flow in Canadian law from these alternative cartographies that attend to 
the names that have been overlooked, along with the complex and extensive 
sensibilities that underlie those names, so the implications for legal sensibilities are 
more nuanced than the exclusive sovereignty of state law has so forcefully implied 
for so long.  
 The language of power that is wed to maps does not dwell only in the toponymies 
by which silences are created. An awareness of how naming reshapes a political 
landscape is part of a broader critical understanding of how spatial knowledge—
contingent, partial, and historical—is disseminated through the map. Not only is the 
information conveyed in maps purely relative, in the sense that “no matter what other 
characteristics objects do not share, they always share relative location”54—the 
information conveyed in maps is also connected to a particular time and place and 
cultural conception of space. It is worth dwelling, as have recent cartographic 
critiques, on the variety of rhetorical devices that are routinely invoked to fortify the 
power of maps before passing on to how exactly modern cartographies got wed to the 
rise of the nation state and the rise of exclusive legal jurisdictions—and how the legal 
 
54 Robinson & Bartz Petchenik, supra note 45 at 4. See also Leonard Guelke, ed., The Nature of 
Cartographic Communication (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977) at 2. 
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cartographies of state, by prioritizing territory over place, empty space of the complex 
interactions between historical subjects. 
VII. Space and Place 
 Place names on maps illustrate one of the ways in which power is wed to the 
representation of space and the manner in which the silences of maps belie alternate 
understandings of the history of the landscape, if not alternate ways of conceiving of 
spatiality and sovereignty. Toponymy is one of the many ways that maps reveal 
themselves to be, as Alan MacEachren notes, reflections of the cultures that produce 
them, as much as they are a representatio  of a section of the earth or activities upon 
it.55 A toponymic map in conformity with the representations of one culture rather 
than another represents the triumph of that culture’s historical and epistemic 
priorities, preferences, and proclivities.  
 Beyond the partiality of toponyms, cartographers have been explicating in 
general how maps elaborate a similar kind of epistemic paramountcy. They have done 
so through an examination of the representational (as opposed to communicative) 
nature of maps—through an examination of h w maps convey what they are intended 
to convey. This includes the question of how maps naturalize spatial understandings 
and subtly reinforce agendas, both political and epistemic. The idea that maps are 
mirrors of nature—or at least that modern cartography advances along a cumulative 
progression toward increasingly more accurate delineations of reality56—is one of the 
articles of faith that critical cartographers have recently assailed. Beginning with 
recognition of the fact that reduced scale, two-dimensional maps necessarily distort 
the complex, three-dimensional world, cartographers have been exploring the ways 
that maps offer selective, incomplete views of reality, and thereby reify cultural 
practices and priorities along with relations of power.57 
 One of the means by which cultural preferences are reified is through the 
valorization of a very particular notion ofaccuracy. The manner in which “scientific” 
approaches to analysis are proffered as superior methods of correcting for 
inaccuracies in apprehensions of reality is one of the ways that a particular western 
European world view has been promoted, through successive maps, as generating 
more and more accurate (because scientific) p tures of the world. Even within 
internal European history, medieval conceptions of Jerusalem, for example, are not 
conceived as one way of representing the place of the city within a whole web of 
shared meanings, but rather as inaccurate and subjective projections of an imaginary 
city that has a “real world” counterpart that can be accurately mapped out. Though 
the idea of what is “real” may indeed acquire its solidity through participation in 
 
55 Alan M. MacEachren, How Maps Work: Representation, Visualization and Design (London: 
Guilford Press, 1995) at 10. 
56 See Harley, supra note 41 at 10. 
57 See e.g. Mark Monmonier, How to Lie with Maps, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1996) at 1. See also Harley, ibid. at 35. 
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contiguous intellectual or semantic space, and thus real in the sense of being 
something close to the depictions of contemporary map making, this is not what is 
projected. What is projected is what is really real. The grids of Euclidean geometry 
and Cartesian space reify a particular ordering of that space. But that is very difficult 
to apprehend from the vantage point of centuries of post-Renaissance cartography 
that is deeply epistemologically wed to the apprehension of the world through 
measurement, tabulation, and classification.  
 Harley has pointed out how modern maps not only facilitate the reproduction of 
such values and make them appear natural, but how they camouflage their own 
historical contingency and the agendas that they promote in the process. Despite their 
ambitions to appear both realistic and natur l, modern maps are driven by a very 
partial world view. As he notes, “an accurate outline map of a nation, such as Cassini 
provided for Louis XIV, was no less a patriotic allegory than an inaccurate one, while 
the ‘plain’ maps of the Holy Land included in Protestant Bibles in the sixteenth 
century in part to validate the literal truth of the text, were as much an essay in sacred 
symbolism as were more pictorial representations of the region.”58 As it would have 
been hard to convince a Protestant cartographer that their cartographic counterpart to 
clearing the church of ornamentation was in fact a further ornamentation of the 
history of Christian theology, the naturalization of the proclivities of modern map 
making are difficult to apprehend as other than the progressive eradication of 
subjectivity from a world that is only objectively knowable through the modern 
talisman of accuracy. 
 The quantification of space lends legitimacy to maps conceived within the 
“cumulative progress of an objective science always producing better delineations of 
reality.”59 This reification of the epistemological values of “scientific” accuracy, when 
added to the toponymic distortions in map making, provide two examples of the ways 
that critical cartography focuses on the representational distortions inherent in the 
enterprise of conventional map making. Beyond these epistemic and political 
reifications, there are other ways in which representational preferences reproduce and 
reinforce world views.  
 These epistemic and political reifications occur through the manipulation of the 
standard logic and semantics of map making—that is, through playing with the 
rhetoric of reading and writing maps to convey a point of view in the same way that 
novelists play with and subtly push the convetions of writing in order to seduce the 
reader into the narrative dream of their novel. This rhetorical repertoire, which has 
been the subject of cartographic deconstruction in the last several decades, includes 
such conventional devices as scales, symbols, colouring, and projections. These 
tropes of cartography underlie cartographic perception and allow a cartographer to 
reconstruct a conception of space by invoking conventional ways of writing and 
reading cartographic texts.  
 
58 Harley, supra note 41 at 77. 
59 Ibid. at 10. 
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 Mark Monmonier provides one small example of the expressive manipulation of 
cartographic convention in his commentary on a map of the Middle East. The map of 
the region depicts each of the Arab countries in Israel’s vicinity (in black), which 
highlights the extraordinarily tiny piece of land (in white) that Israel occupies in 
comparison. The map underscores graphically not only the humility of Israel’s claim 
to the land, but also its vulnerability in the context of (the map’s portrayal of) a 
monolithic and uniformly hostile Arab world . As Monmonier notes, the map 
portrays a cartographic David-and-Goliath contest between tiny Israel and the 
massive territory of the nearby oil-rich Arab nations. Even though the map’s 
geographic facts are accurate, a map comparing land area tells us nothing about 
Israel’s advanced technology, keen military p eparedness, and alliances with the 
United States and other Western powers.60 
As Monmonier points out, the map follows the contours of agreed-upon 
topographical space to convey a qualitative message—a message that is not 
inherently present in the three-dimensional contours of the terrain but which the map 
implies is just as accurately described as present as if one were describing the 
mountains and river basins. The map relies on the shared reality of cartographic 
conventions, with all of the region’s topography shown as a base map and the 
additional information overprinted upon a conventionally agreed-upon framework. 
The map borrows further rhetorical force by relying upon conventional cartographic 
agreements about the use of shading to block off national space in a uniform way 
within borders contiguous with the nation state. This results in flattening out human 
complexity within national borders: the space is represented as uniform and one-
dimensional. The use of colour and shading in this stark black and white map to 
convey a rhetorical message through a play with cartographic convention is one 
sample (of many from critical cartography) of the ways that maps tell stories, all the 
while claiming to be merely transmitting reality. 
 In the same way that the map that Monmonier analyzes can be deconstructed as 
text, borrowing rhetorically on conventions that naturalize a scientific view of the 
world (the map is topographically “accurate” and therefore its message also acquires 
the legitimacy of an accurate representation of the world), it is possible to extend the 
reading the map as a narrative, or as a story that is being told through cartographic 
constructions. I offer this further reading of the map’s text—one perhaps not intended 
as its primary message—to get at another dimension of naive cartography, namely the 
eradication of the existential subject in favor of a projected objectivity.  
 Taking the starting point of cartographic colour conventions to “read” the map, it 
speaks not only as a projection of spurious vulnerability, but also reflects a telling 
depiction of the ominous sense of fragility and doom that clouds the Israeli perception 
of space. This is a qualitative apprehension of the precariousness of Jews in a world 
in which they have for millennia been surrounded, closed in, and crushed by anti-
Semitism and wholesale efforts to obliterate the space that they do take up. In other 
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words, the map is a compelling portrayal of subjectivity—of the emotional content of 
the message. In this sense, the map, if read qualitatively for what its representations 
“tell us” about the world, is an informative representation of an important Jewish 
perception of place in the world. In his book on the psychology of the peace process, 
Ofer Grosbard emphasizes that the preoccupation with who is right and who is wrong 
(as though, like the naive view of modern maps, there is one true delineation of 
history that can correct all others) is a distraction from the far more central question 
of the emotive and narrative content on each side.61 That focus on the epistemology of 
the object over the epistemology of the subject is projected in not only the creation of 
maps focused on correcting misapprehension, but also in the reading of maps that 
might otherwise convey dimensions of humanity. That is, the quantitative emphasis 
on “correct” apprehension misconstrues the real issue that might be more fruitfully 
placed on empathic apprehension of the other’s subjectivity. The peace process—and 
its dark underbelly—is fundamentally an emotional process. 
 The purpose in underlining the subjectivities on either side of both map making 
and map reading, and how the representation of space distorts as much as it conveys 
an understanding of space, is to point to a qualitative apprehension of reality that 
underlies the artful manipulation of quantitative legitimacy. This is a kind of 
subjective feel for the stories that maps tell despite the fact that the modern bent of 
progressive cartography is that maps don’t tell stories, they reflect reality. The 
qualitative silence of the subjective world is seen in the way that the map Monmonier 
refers to occludes   the many, multifaceted, complex, multivocal perspectives in the 
blackened Arab parts of the map. It is also seen through the blackened view of Israel’s 
advanced technology, military preparedness, and alliances with the United States and 
other Western powers—a similarly shallow apprehension of the anxieties and 
complexities that drive such figures.  
 This suppression of the multidimensional nature of human cartography is 
facilitated also by the triumph of space over place within modern cartography. The 
two most standard types of modern map are those of the nation state and those of the 
city, the former depicted (in the context of its neighboring states) as monolithic and of 
a uniform colour, the latter as a grid of fungible streets and roads—the same thing 
reproduced over and over on the grid, with narrowness or wideness as the allowable 
variation. Jeremy Black talks about this kind of obliteration of qualitative 
differentiation in the structure of modern maps, an obliteration that allows for the 
dehumanization of the landscape—even as it intends to create a human cartography. 
As Black notes on the subject of urban cartography,  
In the ‘A-Z’-ing of life, habitations emerge as the spaces between streets. 
Differences within the city or town, for example of wealth, or environmental or 
housing quality, are ignored. The perceptions that create and reflect a sense of 
urban space, often rival, contested and tavistic, are neglected, in favour of a 
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bland uniform background that is described, and thus explained, insofar as there 
is any explanation, in terms of roads.62  
As urban places are depicted in a uniform manner, they can be treated in a uniform 
manner, with the qualitative realities of social space voided, “a geometrical 
landscape” as Harley depicts it, “of cold, non-human facts” in which the “subject is 
kept at bay.”63 In this manner, the most familiar maps of the modern period (national 
and urban maps) reinforce the many silences that allow maps to falsify human reality. 
It should be added that the intersecting grid of minimalizations in statutes and legal 
rules have the same tendency to evacuate legal space of subjectivity. 
 The triumph of space over place—the triumph of a single uniform view of a 
territory over complex, subjectively construed landscapes—has been most potent 
when the “scientific” pretensions of modern cartography have conjoined with modern 
notions of sovereignty and the state. 
VIII. The Map as an Assertion of Sovereignty 
 Maps have historically been interlocked with the sometimes delicate enterprise of 
asserting sovereignty. This is true of the maps created by the English and French 
during their colonial periods in North America: as between themselves, European 
place name maps served as evidence of control over the territory—a component of 
the assertion of sovereignty by each group. As between the descendents of the 
conquering European nations and the indigenous nations of North America, 
Aboriginal place name maps serve to ground land claims and the concomitant 
entitlement to self-government attached to those jurisdictions. In recent years, the 
place name maps of North American Aboriginal groups have been drawn upon both 
in land claims processes and as a basis for elf-government within these jurisdictions. 
Returning to the map of the Middle East in which Israel is a small white swatch of 
land surrounded by a sea of black Arab neighbours, the portrayal of space in a way 
that conveys manifest threats to territorial integrity can be seen as part of an arsenal 
for the assertion and maintenance of sovereignty.  
 To a large extent, maps of the modern era are linked to the territorial principle 
and to the rise of the nation state, in much the same way as immigration laws, border 
police, and economic tariffs. Contemporary maps, with scientific accuracy as their 
talisman, are oriented to the reconstruction of the world along the lines of the modern 
state. This orientation of the representational values and features of cartography—in 
this case measurement, tabulation, and classification—is not new to map making. 
 Maps of the Holy Land are infused with such orientations to a world view—
orientations that tell a moral tale at the same time as they tell a tale about governance. 
Rashi’s medieval “boundary drawings” of Jerusalem, reproduced in standard printed 
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editions of the Babylonian Talmud and copied numerous times by later Talmudic 
commentators, provide another example. His schematic maps represent the city as a 
grid of perpendicular lines. Rashi’s map was designed to accurately indicate relative 
location rather than measurement, explicating thereby the boundaries within which 
those of God’s commandments that were operative in the land of Canaan would 
apply.64 Although the lines are oriented, they are nowhere close to the grid of streets 
or borders that one would find on a contemporary road map. Locating oneself within 
them would not mean eventually finding a particular street corner or plaza; rather, it 
would mean creating oneself within a moral, legal, and theological space. 
 Another representation of orientation can be found in the way that words and 
language (written in this case) relate to the physical space traversed by human beings. 
Rashi wrote the Hebrew script accompanying the map upside down so that the eye 
follows (anomalously for Hebrew) left to right or west to east, so that the line of the 
words graphically portrays the line of the Israelites’ eastward march from Egypt 
across the Red Sea and the Sinai Desert to Transjordan. The city is thereby located 
within an historical, geographical, and theological space.  
 Similarly, many of the representational devices of modern cartography—
toponyms, colour, accuracy as a talisman of authority, space triumphing over place—
are employed in the service of a vision of how the world is divided up—a secular 
theology. In the modern case, the world divides up into the jurisdictions of modern 
nation states, with hairline, almost vertical borders, oriented to a putative 
understanding of “reality” (scientific, measurable, accurate) of the world upon which 
it is hinged. Medieval Jewish maps of the Holy Land, like the many Christian maps 
that placed Jerusalem at the center of interest of the Christian world, aspire to offer a 
“true” representation that corrects former errors.65 The invocation of accuracy is not 
new, but the standards of accuracy have changed according to the map’s function. The 
governance aspirations of a modern state demand a set of standards and conceptions 
tailored to its needs, just as the Halakah (Jewish law) needs a way of conceiving of 
holy space and its demands and commands. 
 There are a number of actions which can be taken to secure the modern vision of 
national sovereignty. These include warfare, boundary making, propaganda, and the 
preservation of law and order. Maps appropriate to these functions of state 
accompany each activity. One of the precursors to the modern need to produce maps 
as assertions of sovereignty is the military map. These maps were contoured initially 
for the reconnaissance required to stake out the land to be defended or conquered; 
 
64 See Catherine Delano Smith & Mayer I. Gruber, “Rashi’s Legacy: Maps of the Holy Land” The 
Map Collector 59 (Summer 1992) 30 at 30, 32. 
65 For example, Rabbi Elijah ben Abraham Mizrachi replicates the following caption on his map of 
the Land of Israel, 1523, based on Rashi’s map in the Talmud: “Here is a delineation of the boundaries 
of the Land of Israel according to the commentary of Rashi, s I received it and as it is true and correct 
according to Rashi’s words” (cited in Ariel Tishby, “Maps after Commentaries by and on Rashi” in 
Tishby, Holy Land in Maps, supra note 42 at 119). 
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contoured also to the particular style of warfare and needs of the military; contoured 
also with an eye to enemy surveillance and subterfuge, for example maps specifically 
drafted with crucial elements missing. Cartographic history contains numerous maps 
of such selective reproduction of terrain. For a great number of recent nation-building 
exercises, surveyors marched alongside soldiers.  
 The British mapping of Israel/Palestine during the First World War and following 
into the mandatory period provides a classic example of mapping tied to the 
aspirations of sovereignty and empire, along with an example of how cartographic 
epistemes are wed to the particular conceptions of governance affiliated with that 
sovereignty.  
 British mapping of the Levantine region began during the French Revolutionary 
Wars, driven, as in North America, by competition for prospective colonies. The 
original maps that the British drew upon were funded by private organizations 
inspired, at least in theory, by philanthropic, archaeological and theological 
aspirations. These philanthropic mappings were increasingly linked to British 
governmental interests, culminating in the work of the Palestine Exploration Fund 
(“PEF”) following its founding in 1865. It was the PEF’s production of maps 
following their major survey of the region in the early 1870s that provided the basis 
for all subsequent military mapping until ground and aerial surveys were undertaken 
in the First World War.66 The mandate of the PEF, originally an extraordinarily well-
placed group of privately funded British clergymen and academics, was laden with 
the tableau vivant Orientalism that Said refers to, as well as the sacred symbolism of 
the by-then entrenched Protestant mission t  unearth the literal truth of the text 
through pictorial representation67—in this case the text of the land. These missions 
were linked eventually to an aspiration to d minate the territory. The PEF’s original 
mission was biblical exploration, stimulated by Victorian religious zeal, informed by 
the emergence of a “scientific” understanding of the natural world that was there, 
ready to be revealed, by a certain detachment and dispassion. As Dame Kathleen 
Kenyon, one of the distinguished biblical explorers of the PEF wrote, 
The middle years of the nineteenth century constituted a period in which the 
great civilizations of Western Asia were being revealed by the space of the 
archaeologist and the interest aroused was very great. ... It was in this climate of 
excitement at the revelation of remains contemporary with the Biblical record 
of the history of the kingdoms of Judah and Israel that the Palestine Exploration 
Fund came into existence. ... The objects of the Fund were the “accurate and 
systematic investigation of the archaeology, the topography, the geology and 
physical geography, the manners and custom  of the Holy Land for Biblical 
Illustration.68 
 
66 See Peter Collier & Rob Inkpen, “Mapping Palestine and Mesopotamia in the First World War” 
(2001) 38:2 The Cartographic Journal 143 at 143-44. 
67 By way of interest, the PEF, which is still going, has amongst its list of luminaries T.E. Lawrence, 
a.k.a. Lawrence of Arabia. 
68 Colin Osman, Jerusalem: Caught in Time (New York: New York University Press, 2000) at vii. 
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It was upon the foundation of the twenty-five sheets printed by Britain’s Ordnance 
Survey in 1880 that British military intelligence built its subsequent refinements, 
most particularly prior to and during the First World War. When the details of the 
PEF’s maps proved inadequate to protect emerging British interests and 
contemporary warfare, these were supplemented by an alliance between surveyors 
and military intelligence. Army training was reformed so that surveyors could be 
commissioned as captains and lieutenants to advance with the army and draw 
topographical survey maps appropriate to the advance of an early twentieth-century 
army. 69 PEF maps were supplemented with aerial photographs, and then with detailed 
plane table surveys. The need to project the land for surveillance from a military 
vantage point generated an enormous volume of topographical surveys, with 
extraordinary detail filling in the foundational (if not at times explicitly covert) work 
of the PEF. 
 The “Wilderness of Zin” survey motivated by the Turko-German alliance and 
carried out by the PEF in 1913-14 provides an illuminating example of the tangled 
links between the natural and human sciences (topography, archaeology, 
anthropology), a Protestant world view, military intelligence, and empire building. 
The objectification of the natural world (the Protestant reading of it as a text to be 
interpreted with a literalist, unadorned sensibility) conjoined with the objectification 
of the other (“the Orient as spectacle, as tableau vivant”) lays the groundwork for a 
further objectification of the territory, thus prepared for appropriation. A survey of the 
Negev Desert was undertaken by Sir Leonard Woolley and by T.E. Lawrence (“of 
Arabia” fame). Both men were serving with Military Intelligence in Cairo when their 
report was published in early 1915. The aims of the survey were:  
‚ To clarify the history of occupation of this area of the southern 
Negev by examining and mapping the archaeological remains 
from all periods; 
‚ To trace the old inland route of caravans from central Palestine to 
Egypt; 
‚ To identify sites mentioned in the Bible and other ancient texts; 
‚ To investigate the area of ‘Ain Kedeis, traditionally associated 
with the site of Kadesh Barnea as mentioned in the Book of 
Exodus in the Old Testament of the Bible.70 
In fact, the survey generated detailed military intelligence under cover of 
archaeological work71—though there was no doubt also sincere interest on the part of 
each surveyor in the naive goals of their undertaking. 
 
69 See Collier & Inkpen, supra note 66. 
70 See online: Palestine Exploration Fund <http://www.pef.org.uk/Pages/ProjWZin.htm>. 
71 See Collier & Inkpen, supra note 66 at 144. 
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 Military maps such as these also illustrate the preference of the state for lines 
drawn in the sand, for declaration of where an army may venture and then no further. 
Drawn with such non-fluid borders, they consolidate a conception of military might 
as well, a sense of when—because where—force is legitimately invoked against 
another territorial intruder.  
 Beyond these initial reconnaissance maps, maps have been tied to the state-
building enterprise through their dissemination of corrected information, and through 
their reinforcement of orthodoxies. When military maps succeed in facilitating the 
surveillance of the land and in guaranteeing the advance of an army, maps get 
impregnated with a kind of legitimacy. This legitimacy stems from an alliance with 
the successes of force. The triumph of force says something about human relations—
if only, and perhaps most potently, about triumph itself. This legitimacy can extend 
deeply into the world view associated with the successful marshalling of force, 
including the versions of accuracy that allow for advances to succeed, as well as the 
gestalt or world view that fosters (and is synergistically reliant upon) such claims of 
accuracy. Force triumphs if the version of corrected vision upon which it builds 
triumphs. This partly explains Harley’s comment that maps are preeminently a 
language of power, not of protest.72 Officially, a conception of land drawn by the 
conquered is a representation, not a map. As Dorling and Fairbairn note, “A picture is 
a map when it is drawn by someone with the authority to draw maps.”73 
 As much as maps are wed to sovereignty in the modern era through their alliance 
with military force and military surveillance, they are also wed to sovereignty through 
law. The military maps provide reconnaissance of lines that will need to be 
consolidated into borders through more gente l forms of legitimacy. The borders of 
state, however conceived, are the lin s within which the law runs.  
 As the example from Rashi illustrates, maps that lay out the boundaries of 
jurisdiction are not new. But Rashi’s medieval conception of the Holy Land and law 
generated a very particular schematic with which to represent the land. As Delano 
Smith and Gruber point out, his preoccupation with mapping the dividing lines 
between the sacred and the profane is tied to Jewish belief and how it links up with 
the realm of geography and how both relate to law. To the question “Why should 
God’s word concern itself with cartography?”, Rashi answers: 
Insofar as many [of God’s] commandments are operative in the land [of 
Canaan] ... he [Moses] was required [by God] to write down the boundaries on 
each of [the land of Canaan’s four] sides so as to inform you that from these 
boundaries inward the commandments are operative. [Commentary, Numbers 
34.2].74 
The union of theology and cartography is notanomalous in the history of either; nor 
did the association of borders and law only emerge with the rise of the nation state. 
 
72 Supra note 41. 
73 Supra note 52 at 71. 
74 Smith & Gruber, supra note 64 at 32. 
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However, the conception of territory, jurisdiction, and accurate representation of each, 
and of each in relation to the other, is very different from modern statist conceptions 
of the same. Space may need to be understood as territory in each version, and each 
may address clearly identified people within that territory, but the conception of 
accuracy and “realistic” portrayl of a “natural” world is different in each—and is 
therefore tied to different legal formulations of appropriate governance.  
 While Rashi’s commitment to accuracy operates with a more allusive, 
associational and dread-filled context, the contemporary commitment to accuracy is 
beholden to the gods of measurement and precision. Rashi, scripting his 
commentaries in Troyes, France and never having traveled to the Holy Land, is 
disciplined by the text, committed to ensuring that the depiction of the Holy Land 
conformed to the Holy words in Numbers 34.3, Numbers 34.4-11, Judges 21.19, 
Ezekiel 45.7 or Ezekiel 48.35. The definition in the lines drawn is corrected by the 
text. Contemporary maps of state, and the refinements of definition upon which they 
are dependent, allow the commitment to measurement and tabulation of an objective 
natural order “out there” to offer progressive corrections to maps.  
IX. Cadastral Topography and Sovereignty 
 Maps are not only like law in their conveyance of authority: each discipline is 
also mutually reinforcing of the other’s imbedded world view. They are like Möbius 
strips in having only one side and one edge, and in being therefore unorientable.75 
The cadastral mapping of Palestine, occurring over the same period that the PEF was 
undertaking its biblical explorations, provides an example of how conceptions of 
accuracy and “dispassionate” scientific attachment to measurement are conjoined 
with a mission of state—and a conception of law—quite distinct from the theological 
mission of cartographers like Rashi. These maps confirm the single-sided, single-
edged nature of maps and laws—and the single world view that makes up the texture 
of the strip of that single edge and side.  
 Cadastral maps are those that set out as a matter of public record—hence in a 
manner controlled by a bureaucratic authority— he value, extent, and ownership of 
land as a basis of taxation. In order to render public, central, and authoritative such a 
construction of the land, each of the individual plots of land has to be not only laid 
out according to criteria that quantify it in standard terms of mathematical reference 
(typically metes and bounds); it must also be placed within a structured framework 
based on a uniform system of quantification that equally quantifies the surrounding 
plots of land. If the information that maps convey is purely relative, this is not only 
with respect to the location of other fixed reference points, but relative to a 
 
75 “Very roughly a surface is orientable if it has two side  so that, for example, is it possible to paint 
it with two different colours. A sheet of paper or the surface of a sphere are examples of orientable 
surfaces” (Dan Summons, “What is the Mobius Strip?”, online: Physlink.com <http://www.physlink. 
com/Education/AskExperts/ae401.cfm>). 
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standardized way of conceiving of space—a conception that itself moves to the 
background so things can be relatively located upon its foreground. The emergence of 
cadastral maps in general, from the Renaissance onwards, laid over topographical 
maps that group the terrain under a single rubric of measurements, assisted the project 
of lining human space up into a single world view. The way that cadastral maps 
served this function in Palestine, as well as the way that cadastral maps are tied to 
statecraft and the conjoining of a particularly modern conception of the relationship 
between space and law, has been nicely laid out in Dov Gavish and Ruth Kark’s 
article, “The Cadastral Mapping of Palestine, 1858-1928.”76 The symbiotic overlay of 
such narrowly conceived ideas of land and law on top of the foundations of broader 
topographical surveys (undertaken, at least originally, with both theological and 
colonial aspirations in mind) can also be seen in the historical coincidence of this 
cartographic exercise. 
 The superimposition of a cadastral construction of property boundaries and 
territorial subdivisions on a swath of land, made to create units suitable for transfer or 
to define the limitations of title, is linked to a very particular conception of 
governance, society, and control. As Gavish and Kark point out:  
From the Renaissance until the late nineteenth century the cadastral map was, 
in many areas, an established adjunct to effective government monitoring and 
control of land. ... [A] number of uses to which cadastral maps have been put 
by state agencies [have been identified], including evaluation and management 
of state land resources, land reclamation, land redistribution and enclosure, 
colonial settlement and land taxation. Maps also served as symbols of state 
control over land and as tools of an enlightened government. ... [C]adastral 
mapping constitutes an instrument ofcontrol which both reflects and 
consolidates the power of those who commission it, whether economic, social 
or political.77  
It is not as though the land itself in any way suggests that it naturally breaks down 
into cadastral units; once it is so compartmentalized, however, those maps take on an 
irrefutability, a reality, of their own. Linked to both original force (following in the 
footsteps of military maps) and to the epistemology that accompanies that force 
(topographical surveys outlining increasingly more accurate perceptions of land—
always under the tightly conceived criterion of accuracy), cadastral surveys both lend 
the state the authority of measurement ad control while they allow the state to 
measure and control.  
 Though the original association between the cadastral maps and modernity may 
have derived from a link with the West, the British were not the first imperial power 
in Palestine to be aware of the affiliation of cadastral maps with statecraft. The 
Ottomans, during the nineteenth-century surge in cadastral surveys throughout 
Europe, were alert to the power inherent in such spatial reconfigurations. As Ireland, 
 
76 Dov Gavish & Ruth Kark, “The Cadastral Mapping of Palestine, 1858-1928” (1993) 159:1 The 
Geographical Journal 70. 
77 Ibid. at 70. 
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France, Austria, Bavaria, and the United States (among others) were superimposing 
cadastral maps upon topographical maps and creating public registries of title through 
these cartographic devices, the Ottomans also began to pursue a similar ordering and 
systematization of the lands under their control. Coincident with this aspiration, the 
law proposing such a conceptual rearrangement of the territories under their 
jurisdiction was passed in 1858. Though the Ottoman Land Law of 1858 created a 
Land Code and opened three Land Registry offices in Palestine, creating an official 
system of Land Books and Records, making compulsory the registration of arable 
land, the registration of land was based on deeds.78 These deeds were not imposed on 
a larger survey or uniform framework.  
 The symbiotic relationship between a more global reconceptualization of land 
under the new “science” of topography and the systematization of title according to 
cadastres—a relationship that needs to be closely maintained for the consistent and 
thorough management and control of land—is apparent in the fatal way in which 
Ottoman cadastral surveys were isolated from larger topographical surveys. The 
importance of rooting cadastral to topographical m ps is apparent also in the ultimate 
consequences of the disjunction between cadastral and topographic maps. What 
persists in the documentary record are maps of Palestine that “shared no common 
guidelines, lacked any uniformity with regard to cartographic method, legal status, 
quality and appearance.”79 The registration of individual deeds under the Ottoman 
Land Law in fact was completed, for the most part, in accordance with standards of 
quantification that were generally recognized. The deeds were based on metes and 
bounds, described the length of the land and the square area enclosed, depicted 
bearing and scale, and described neighbouring lands. But they were detached from 
the larger system of coordinates that topographical surveys generate. The latter were 
not yet available—at least not in a form consistent with the epistemic criteria of statist 
cartography. As a result, the deeds, though accurate in describing very local plots 
according to the same terms of reference employed by modern topographical 
mapping (the same frame of reference for accuracy), remain impossible to localize in 
a larger context.  
 Though the Ottoman Land Act was intended to introduce those elements of order 
and systematization that would bring private land into the purview and control of 
modern states, when Jewish settlers began to arrive in Palestine, the first wave 
coming in 1882, the Ottoman government quickly restricted Jews (and Christian 
settlers) from land registration. Until 1867 foreigners could not legally possess 
immovable property in Palestine, and following 1867, as a result of pressure from 
foreign governments, foreigners could only purchase land if the government of the 
country from which they came entered into agreements with the Ottoman 
government. Jews and some Christian settlers often did not have such agreements 
 
78 See ibid. at 71. 
79 Ibid. 
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operating at an intergovernmental level. Thus they were excluded from purchasing 
and registering land.  
 Since excluded groups (principally Jews) lacked the capacity to publicly register 
their land purchases through the cadastral system, indeed lacked legal personality in 
Muslim and Ottoman law, purchases of larger pieces of land were made on their 
behalf by third parties. The land was registered vis-à-vis the third party purchasers 
with the equivalent of counter letters. Within the group, the land was parceled up and 
an internal cadastral analogue was generated, each plot measured, and the dimensions 
of the land noted, along with the legal status of the land and any obligations imposed 
upon it. All of these details were registered in the Hebrew Land Books. Alongside 
these internal registries, both the settlers and local authorities also hired surveyors and 
other technical workers to carry out large-scale topographical surveys that served as 
the underlying foundation of this cadastral system (which was not yet officially 
recognized). 
 By the time the British took over the Mandate of Palestine, the discrepancies 
between Ottoman cadastral survey of deeds (which were dislocated from general 
large-scale topographical maps) and the occulted Jewish cadastral maps (which, 
though unofficial, were integrated with underlying topographical points of reference) 
were resolved by bringing the Jewish cadastral maps out of the shadows. The British 
brought Sir Ernest Dowson from Egypt to undertake cadastral reform (consistent, of 
course, with the version of sovereignty and governance that they had been developing 
alongside modern statecraft). One of his most strident recommendations was to bring 
those maps that were most consistent with the quantitative methodology of state-
affiliated cartography out into officialdom. As he wrote, 
The third piece of immediately and permanently useful work consist in taking 
over the Land Registers of various Colonies, for the most part Jewish, who have 
long complained with considerable justification that their own Land Registers 
though reliable and comprehensive are legally invalid, while the Government’s 
Registers though legally valid are unreliable and incomprehensible.80  
When this legitimation of the occulted land registries was further consolidated by a 
survey of Palestine, undertaken shortly after the institution of the British Mandate in 
1920, the far-reaching solidity of the modern cartographic episteme—governed by a 
putatively universal science of measurement and order and the principle of 
classification and ordered tabulation, reinforced by a conception of legal order 
running along the same single-edged, single-sided epistemic surface—was 
entrenched. Alternatives were thereby excluded. And quite literally, those staking 
alternative claims to the land, alternative ways of conceiving of a relationship to 
occupied space, were excluded. Those landowners who today attempt to locate their 
land and assert ownership, having possession of deeds in conformity with the 
Ottoman Land Act, find themselves unable to locate their property as the deed does 
not fit into the larger topographical survey that became the substrata (the cartographic 
 
80 Cited in Gavish & Kark, ibid. at 76. 
936 MCGILL LAW JOURNAL / REVUE DE DROIT DE MCGILL [Vol. 50 
 
 
land upon which the cadastral plan was laid) of public registration.81 Location is 
relative not to three-dimensional reality “out there”, but is relative to the standardized 
way of conceiving the space within which location has meaning.  
 Of course, far more unrecoverable within this framework were the earlier 
conceptions of ownership, property, and relationship to space that underlay the 
Ottoman mapping in 1858. Mapping out this sense of space would be a step removed 
from re-creating underlying topographical projections in order to clarify nineteenth-
century cadastral plots, and would be more like attending to the spatial sensibilities in 
Aboriginal maps, laying these on top of topographical surveys to get a more nuanced 
feel for the deep and varied contours of the landscape.  
X. Cartographic Intimation 
 I have followed, through these meanderings, a very narrow trajectory from the 
representative and rhetorical nature of maps and their linkages to power and 
sovereignty. There are a phenomenally large number of maps of the Holy Land and of 
Jerusalem. And there are a larger number of contemporary maps. Many of these are 
linked up to other elements of the laws in play on the territory. I have focused on the 
law associated with military surveys and cadastral maps. Many other kinds of maps 
that track, for example, constitutional law, or absentee property law, or nationalist 
holdings, have carried out similar missions in Israel to the maps I have focused on. I 
have focused on these particular maps because they offer insights into the various 
epistemologies and representational devices at play in contemporary cartography and 
the link between knowledge (as cartographically constructed or revealed) and power.  
 As I indicated above, echoing Harley, maps more than other cultural phenomena 
speak the language of power. Accessing and reading an alternative and subversive 
cartography is accordingly often an act of imagination—an effort to read the silences, 
often intentionally wrought—in maps.  
 I am not certain that an alternative map would be a single affirmative entity, a 
single “more accurate” and dense representation of the territory. An alternative 
cartography might not indeed be the representation of a singular reality. Submitting to 
the criteria of authenticity under which cartography has been laboring may indeed be 
an unnecessary capitulation. Aboriginal place name maps—or rather not the inert 
maps but how those maps are used—may intimate a more subversive cartographic 
model of the middle ground. Rather than the maps simply being laid over a “real” 
topography, like so many transparencies, the maps should be read in dialogue with 
other historical maps, the way novels leave an intertextual trail of the writer’s prior 
literary wanderings, the way one reads novels and hermeneutically situates them 
within a literary tradition. They offer a direction of correction—not only for the 
location and naming of places, but for the sense of completion and wholeness that 
other maps have mistakenly appropriated for themselves. If location is relative not 
 
81 See ibid. 
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only to three-dimensional reality “out there” but also to standardized ways of 
conceiving space within which location has meaning, then an alternative cartography 
would relativize maps and locations to the details of other regular, mundane, 
pedestrian (and, most particularly in the case of Jerusalem, otherworldly) world views 
that provide maps with their projection of reality. 
 Comprehending Mount Moriah and its ancient encircling city, from all of its 
corners and alleyways and angles, provides a hint of how such a map might begin to 
look. This could only be the most abbreviated of sketches, not only because the maps 
that one would want to begin swallowing up into this prolegomenon to a dialogic 
description are so detailed and so abundant—effectively as numerous as the 
inhabitants and travelers who have wandere  over and through its twisted alleyways 
and tunnels in three-dimensions or in their imaginations—that it would be impossible 
to encompass them in a minute survey. It would also be logically abbreviated as the 
intention of such cartography is not to reproduce a singular reality but rather to set a 
multiplicity of map-making enterprises into motion with each other.  
 One could compile a composite model of what the sleepless eyes of Jerusalem’s 
surveillance cameras take in as they scan the surrounding space, framing alleyways 
and egresses and human beings suspiciously. 
 One could also start by casting our imagination out over the Mount from one of 
the children’s kites that frequently criss-cross the air space over the old city, hanging 
taut in the wind and swooping in crescents like the swallows. Although from there 
one could take in the Temple Mount/Haram El Sharif, the Church of the Holy 
Sepulcher in the northwestern quadrant of the city and the now-exposed southern 
wall that runs perpendicular to the Western Wall (formerly the Wailing Wall), we 
would probably be struck more by the quality of light cast over the Old City, the 
nestling of human architecture within the surrounding hills and Judean desert haze.  
 The closest to this perspective of Jerusalem that I have come across—kindred to 
the sensation of being tossed, as a child, in the air by a favorite uncle; kindred to the  
dream where one is desperately fleeing a crushing rodef (or pursuer) only to discover 
with exquisite delight that one can depart the ground and escape gravity, flying and 
floating over the trees and rooftops—is a map of the Old City drawn up by Hermann 
Bollmann in 1967 following the Six Day War.82 Bollmann created the map by 
photographing different angles and perspectiv s of the city from the ground and from 
the air and then sketched the map, with the depth of three dimensions, in which 
“every window and balcony, every floor and special building, and even such things as 
construction cranes were blended into the map as part of the panorama at that 
particular point in time.”83 The frame of the map has the name “Jerusalem” written 
along its borders in a Babel of the world’s languages and scripts. From up close, the 
 
82 To access an electronic depiction of this map, see online: The Middle Ground <http:// 
themiddleground.osgoode.yorku.ca/default.htm>. 
83 Tishby, Holy Land in Maps, supra note 42 at 160. 
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ink etching of trees and turrets in the wall, the light coming from the northwest 
leaving the southeast side of buildings and cliff edges in cool blue-gray shade, the 
colours of the exposed earth yellow and ochre, have a quality similar to children’s 
illustrations, beckoning sweetly for the reader to descend to one of the streets, warm 
in the glow of the afternoon, and wander.  
 One could also map out the quotidian journeys taken by those who frequent the 
Western Wall or the Dome of the Rock or the Church of the Holy Sepulchre (at a 
distance from Mount Moriah, though still within one of the quarters of the sixteenth-
century Suleiman walls of Jerusalem) and expose the Old City through its tunnels and 
covered alleyways and narrow passages. One could begin with the loving familiarity 
of the places that are most holy to them and then follow their regular journeys on 
daily errands under the canopy of sky to schools and markets and pizza parlors. From 
subjectivities like averted eyes, ways of walking, hostile stares, and furtive steps one 
could map out which parts of the city are occupied in what manner by which 
inhabitants, and which parts are off limits to the other. Although Alcalay’s Levantine 
Jerusalem may be the home of the people living there, the composite of those who 
frequent Jerusalem contain in a microcosm all and more of the compounded, 
conflicted, puzzled, enraged, anxious, utopian, and grieving world views, with their 
attendant histories and far-reaching maps, that one might find in any analysis of the 
Middle East. There are any number of ambitious maps projected out from the 
perspective gained by these daily excursion  that possessively seek to encompass 
larger parts of the terrain so that these perambulations can feel safer and more at 
home. They can be found in diverse peace plans, and in any of the ways that the city 
of Jerusalem is divided up or united (or left to be later jurisdictionalized in light of the 
perilously fraught maps of use and occupation that each trajectory can produce). 
Arguments are made that, in the crucible of the facts on the ground, these maps are 
the only viable middle ground. 
 In creating a cartographic projection of the middle ground, one could also start 
with the way of comprehending place that is most familiar to the modern imagination: 
with a depiction of the “facts” about the “space”, as revealed through the “scientific” 
revelations of archaeological digs. The Jerusalem Archaeological Park that 
encroaches on the south side of the enormous stone blocks that make up the wall that 
Herod built around 37 BC is the most significant archaeological site in the region. 
The foundation that operates the archaeological excavation has posted a fairly 
extraordinary website that lays out the history in which its artifacts can be located as 
well as accompanying historical maps and virtual reconstruction models.84 The 
excavation reaches the Temple Mount on the north, the slope of the Mount of Olives 
and the Kidron Valley on the east, and the Valley of Hinnom on the west and the 
south. In the latter quarter, excavations have proceeded literally right under the blue-
gray shadow of the Al-Aqsa Mosque, prompting concerns and complaints that the 
digs, sponsored primarily by ministries in the Israeli government and Israeli 
 
84 See online: The Jerusalem Archaeological Park <http://www.archpark.org.il/intro.asp>. 
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government companies, through their tunneling and digging, are undermining the 
supporting structure of the edifices, pivotal to Islam, above.  
 This anxiety has its counterpart in archaeologists concerned about uncovered 
artifacts buried in the earth on the summit. Excavations can proceed within Israeli 
jurisdiction around and below the platform of the Mount, but the Mount itself remains 
under the jurisdiction of an Islamic Waqf, an institution in Islamic law that creates an 
endowment or assignment of revenues or land for religious or charitable purposes in a 
form of trust. Just as the Muslim occupants of the Haram are suspicious that the 
objects and places that sustain their world view are being treated cavalierly by the 
digs around the Herodian walls that support them, so archaeologists are anxious that 
renovations to the mosque and to the Dome of the Rock are not treating their objects 
and places with respect commensurate to the place of the artifacts within an 
archaeologist’s world view.  
 The same anxiety about the physical sanctity of place is felt along the Western 
Wall where there are concerns that digging and renovation under the Dome are 
causing the wall to bulge. That there is less concern about the secular world view 
underpinning excavations along the Southern wall is no doubt due to the fact the 
excavations are being sponsored by a Jewish state.  
 One could assert that the template for all other maps of the middle ground will be 
the neutral place that contemporary science discloses and depicts, devoid, by its own 
claims, of value. This is a middle ground that is familiar to the Western world: that the 
religiously non-committed counterpart of modern science—the secular state—should 
have priority of place as a result of its indifference (cumulatively and progressively 
established) to one or the other God. Scien e has betrayed Judaism, equally to Islam 
and Christianity, and hence reveals no partiality. This would be the map that is most 
congenial and least unsettling to the modern post-Enlightenment political landscape. 
The latter, though, appears to be something that is disappearing on the horizon as 
increasingly national discourses are laced with religious overtones that would have 
been difficult to imagine twenty years ago. From a Canadian point of view,85 
following the 2004 American election, that landscape seems at times to be perilously 
close to becoming a distant and forgotten land, to be longingly and lovingly mapped 
out in the imagination of map makers in the same manner that Rashi and the 
Crusaders drew up maps of a Holy Land upon which they never set eyes. 
 Daniel Lazare echoes this concern about the slippery purchase of the secular 
world view in Israel. Religious laws are creeping into the daily lives of Israelis, 
 
85 Canadians are, in a larger generality than the United States, less religious and less inclined to 
favour a link between church and state. The 2001 census indicates that 16 per cent of Canadians 
declared themselves as having no religion; thatfigure was 12 percent a decade ago. The increase 
represents a significant 44 per cent jump (online: Statistics Canada <http://www12.statcan.ca/english/ 
census01/products/highlight/Religion/PR_Menu1.cfm?Lang=E>). The 2004 American elections were 
widely viewed as a resurgence of the religious right’s hold on American politics. 
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citizens of a country that, for its founders, aspired to emphatically secular socialist 
values. As illustration he points out, somewhat stridently, that  
family law in Israel is in the hands of Orthodox mullahs—er, I mean, rabbis. 
But few really grasp all that this entails. To put it in American terms, imagine 
that you are looking to get married or divorced, or to adopt a child or undergo 
an abortion, or to bury one of your parents in a local cemetery, and that to do so 
you must first obtain the permission of your local Southern Baptist minister. 
Even Southern Baptists would be outraged. Yet, as Noah Efron makes clear in 
his stunning new book, Real Jews: Secular vs. Ultra-Orthodox and the Struggle 
for Jewish Identity in Israel, this and more are what Israeli Jews face on a daily 
basis. Take kashrut, the exceedingly complicated Jewish dietary laws governing 
what foods are forbidden, which can be mixed and which, such as meat and 
dairy products, must be kept strictly separate. As Efron, an American-born 
Israeli who teaches at Bar Ilan University near Tel Aviv, tells it, kashrut affects 
not only what Israelis eat but, thanks to an increasingly expansive definition 
being pushed by the Orthodox rabbinate, what they believe and say.86 
Lazare is emphatic that “[m]ore religion, o matter how progressively construed, is 
the last thing this God-soaked piece of terrain needs.”87 Lazare’s prophylactic against 
the projections of religious (or nationalist) perspective is greater secularism for 
Israel—ultimately a one-state solution that eliminates the Jewish nature of the state in 
favour of a complete secularism. “Instead of immersing themselves in separate 
religious traditions,” he asserts, “Jews and Palestinian Muslims and Christians must 
join in a common tradition based on internationalism, secularism and democracy. 
Instead of burying themselves in ancient texts, they must understand the irrelevance 
of those texts to modern politics.”88 
 Given the emphasis in this article on a shared or common place for the state, the 
one-state solution that Lazare offers is admittedly appealing. After all, binationalism, 
bilingualism, and bijuridicalism are deeply held and long-standing Canadian ideals. 
Although inchoate for too long and now increasingly explicit in at least Canadian 
Aboriginal common law, Aboriginal nations, languages, and legal traditions are now 
recognized as part of Canada’s “one state/many nations” model for the middle 
ground. This model is predicated on internationalism, secularism, and democracy. 
Further, in light of, for example, the revelations of Israeli Prime Minister Ariel 
Sharon’s closest friend and colleague, Dov Weissglas (Senior Adviser and Chief of 
Staff) to the effect that Israeli disengagement from the Gaza strip “was actually 
intended to prevent a peace process, to consign [American President George] Bush’s 
road map to oblivion, and to preclude the emergence of a Palestinian state of any 
kind,”89 it is hard not to conclude that the “realities on the ground” in the occupied 
 
86 Daniel Lazare, “The One-State Solution” The Nation 277:14 (3 November 2003) 23 at 28. 
87 Ibid.  
88 Ibid. 
89 Henry Siegman, “Sharon and the Future of Palestine” New York Review of Books, LI:19 (2 
December 2004) 7. 
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territories have passed the point of being dislodged and thus passed the point where 
even the two-state solution has remotely credible prospects of viability.90 
 However, I’m not certain that the evacuation of religion from public space and 
public places in favour of a “neutral” commons is necessarily the best way to bring 
about a rich and robust middle ground, a deep intercultural reservoir from which the 
best in each tradition can draw. As I have argued thus far, this is partly because I am 
suspicious of the neutrality, and congeniality, of the space that secularism has mapped 
out.  
 No doubt archaeological history is a corrective and offers a compelling way to be 
in the world, and surely the loss of the Buddhist statuary or the objects that underlie 
the Temple Mount calls out for a lament not only from a Buddhist or Talmudic or 
Islamic or religio-cultural vantage point but also, and just as poignantly, from the 
point of view of that robust secular way of understanding humanity. There is, in the 
impressive majesty of secular history, irreplaceable value in, for example, the 
pleasure of culture for its own sake; the swollen details and t bleau vivant 
reconstructions; the location of the places and things of humanity within the 
incomprehensibly large ocean of post-Renaissance human knowledge. This secular 
understanding, however, is not by virtue of its accomplishments necessarily the best-
placed perspective from which to draft a m p of the middle ground (that is, if only 
one is to be chosen). 
XI. Inventing a Present and a Future 
 It is tempting to assert, in the spirit of the laments for the Buddhist statues 
demolished by the Taliban, that rtifactual rapport with the physical world at least 
provides a testament to a universal history, shared by all. The archaeological process 
of disencrusting the physical world of its sacred aureole seems to parallel modern 
cartography’s belief that it advances along a cumulative progression toward 
increasingly more accurate delineations of reality. The “real” reality of the object is its 
place within the place of things in the history of humanity. The imputed 
misapprehension of the archaeological significance of artifacts derives from a 
perception that the religious apprehension of the physical world is partial and biased, 
misconstruing the place of things in the universal history of humanity, and therefore 
permitting a cavalier disregard for the object. Just as geological and topographical 
surveys are intended to serve as correctives for the imaginative projections of maps 
like Rashi’s or the Protestant Bible maps, a sense of indignance accompanies the 
perception that archaeology (like cartography) can correct misapprehensions of the 
world, rather than just replace them with its own apprehensions.  
 This tone of indignance, along with the sense that everything but the 
archaeological understanding is political and biased, can be heard at the edges of a 
growing body of literature that emerged out f missions such as those conducted by 
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the Palestine Exploration Fund. Ironically, despite Dame Kenyon’s acceptance of the 
PEF’s stated mission as the “accurate and systematic investigation of the archaeology, 
the topography, the geology and physical geography, the manners and customs of the 
Holy Land for Biblical Illustration,”91  out of those very exercises a disjuncture 
opened up over the course of the twentieth century. Literary criticism of the Bible in 
the nineteenth century uncovered linguistic and textual recurrences that established 
that the Pentateuch was not written by Moses but was redacted and retrospectively 
ordered by scribes in the post-exhilic period. Similarly, biblical archaeology moved 
from its original agenda, sometimes explicit, sometimes implicit, of selectively 
seeking “factual” confirmation of dearly held articles of faith.92 As the mission was 
passed down through subsequent generations of Holy Land archaeologists to the late 
twentieth century, archaeology increasingly found its discoveries at odds with the 
faith-based version of history it had originally sought to confirm.  
 The original mission may have been inspired by a British Protestant desire to 
disencrust, with the newfound utensils of science, the overly ornamented Holy Land 
of Catholicism and renew, through proofs, Protestantism’s version of the place of God 
in human history. The team of investigators, however, found themselves consistently 
disappointed over the years by the way in which the artifacts that turned up (or failed 
to turn up) frustrated the story that they were trying to tell. Just as the British Mandate 
was taken over by the new state of Israel, so biblical archaeology was appropriated by 
aspirations to find scientific support for nationalist claims to a deep historical Jewish 
presence on the land, to find archaeological support for the belief that the Bible is the 
history of a real people. And just as the Protestant pursuit of verification was thwarted 
by artifacts, so the Israeli archaeological establishment has had to concede that, as the 
title to Daniel Lazare’s review of biblical archaeology in Harper’s Magazine suggests, 
archaeology refutes the Bible’s claim to history.93 
 Given how archaeology appears to have prevailed despite the deep-seated, 
scientifically misoriented, and politically committed drives that sought to marshal it, 
it does seem as though, through a cumulative progression of corrections, the really 
“real” has been revealed, a universal history disclosed that should emerge as the 
ultimate arbitrator of disputes about the land, its history, and its people. It appears that 
the maps provided by the Jerusalem Archaeological Park should provide the 
substratum for all subsequent accurate maps of the Holy City. They appear to be 
neutral and wholly uncommitted politically and theologically. The political 
counterpart of these maps would clearly be the vision of a secular state with religion 
at most allowed a role akin to religious visits to the Israel Museum’s Shrine of the 
Book—the artifacts housed in a secular building in which visitors submit primarily to 
 
91 Kathleen M. Kenyon, Digging Up Jerusalem (London: Ernest Benn, 1974), cited in Osman, 
supra note 68. 
92 For a summary of the developments in Holy Land archaeology, see Daniel Lazare, “False 
Testament: Archaeology Refutes the Bible’s Claim to History” Harper’s Magazine 304:1822 (March 
2002) 39 [Lazare, “False Testament”]. 
93 Ibid. 
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the rituals of beholding, detachedly, though with awe, the spectacle of modern 
science.  
 And modern spectacle and ritual it is, attendant with all of the hallowedness and 
cyclical returns of religious rites. As the Israel Museum describes the shrine, “the 
dome covers a structure which is two-thirds below the ground, and is reflected in a 
pool of water that surrounds it. The striking juxtaposition of the white dome and 
black basalt wall, precise and opposing geometrical shapes, creates a monumental 
effect and contributes an extraordinary phenomenon in the Israeli landscape.”94 The 
architectural underlining of the sanctity of the place, housing “the greatest manuscript 
discovery of modern times,”95 is reinforced by rituals of revelation and reverence 
eerily resonant with annual Talmudic cycles of textual renewal. The inner logic of the 
rituals is driven by a quite different sense of necessity and almost otherworldly 
common sense: “As the fragility of the scrolls makes it impossible to display them on 
a continuous basis, a system of scroll rotation has recently been developed. After a 
scroll has been exhibited for 3-6 months, it is removed from its showcase and placed 
temporarily in a special storeroom, where it is given a ‘rest’ from exposure. Scrolls 
that have been removed from exhibition are replaced by other authentic scroll 
fragments.”96 If a spiritual message has been rescued from the dark cave in which it 
was buried, it speaks ultimately to the triumphant and auspicious revelation of secular 
science, no longer handmaiden to religion but occasional heroic and vigorous 
protector. 
 Compelling as this vision of the relationship between state and religion may be, 
the affiliation with such an insight and the religious forms that it borrows underline 
the rhetorical flourishes of contemporary representations of accuracy, the way that 
such rituals command a certain stance and attitude to what they are revealing. One 
could conclude from the representational economy of the presentation of scientific 
ideas that this is all mere puffery, mere contentless rhetoric, all artifice, and no 
substance. The “thing” at the imputed centre of the frames that govern our ways of 
looking at objects is not a thing at all, but merely creation of the framing devices 
invoked. At worse, a claim can be made that such illusion (in this case scientific) 
amounts to an opiate, camouflaging with unparalleled success unspoken political 
agendas.  
 The step from emphasizing the rhetorical, ritualistic, and representational aspects 
of modern science to the claim that they are lying or at least false is one that need not 
be taken. And indeed, in the space between taking it and refraining from taking it, 
there may well be an opening for a middle ground between all of the contending 
visions for the Middle East. There may indeed be another way to approach the 
 
94 Online: Israel Museum <http://www.imj.org.il/eng/shrine/>. 
95 William Foxwell Albright to John C. Trevor in March 1948, assessing Trevor’s photos of the 
scroll of Isaiah from Cave 1 at Qumran, cited online: Into His Own <http://virtualreligion.net/iho/ 
dss.html>. 
96 Online: Israel Museum <http://www.imj.org.il/eng/shrine/scrollsondisplay.html>. 
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various visions that is not focused on the accuracy or inaccuracy of claims. Such an 
approach, consistent with the representation l focus of this article, depends on 
another kind of revelation. This opening, that I might call the expressive potential of 
shared space—is present also for cartography and law. 
 I have laid out above how particular and contingent and rhetorical many of the 
maps of the Middle East are, including those that are most modern and most beholden 
to the auspicious talisman of accuracy. It would be inaccurate to say that those maps 
are lying. Similarly, it would be unfair to claim, unequivocally, that the laws that are 
built up upon those maps are unjust. Rather something akin to Grosbard’s 
psychoanalysis of the peace process might be called for—and this might suggest the 
analogue of the middle ground of Canadian Aboriginal Common Law (all the while 
speaking, in a continuation of that centuries-old dialogue between the God of 
Abraham and the Great Manitou, to the ways that Canadian common law could 
attend to its own injustices).  
 Grosbard’s therapeutic intervention underlin s that “[t]he loss of our ability to 
listen is the greatest threat to our existence.”97 The relief for this psychological 
distress is not to hear better, but to listen more deeply. In other words, the resolution 
of the argument is paradoxically not solved by discovering who is correct. The 
resolution comes more from attending to the subjective content of what is said—a 
process not unlike attending to the representational conveyance of a map, the picture 
of the world that it projects—rather than the information thereby conveyed. 
 This approach is not unfamiliar to secular proponents such as Daniel Lazare. As 
he points out in his Harper’s article,  
To say that the Jerusalem priesthood intentionally cooked up a phony history is 
to assume that the priests possessed a modern concept of historical truth and 
falsehood, and surely this is not so. As the biblical minimalist Thomas L. 
Thompson has noted, the Old Testament’s authors did not subscribe to a 
sequential chronology but to some more complicated arrangement in which the 
great events of the past were seen as taking place in some foggy time before 
time. The priests, after all, were not inventing a past; they were inventing a 
present and, they trusted, a future.98 
Lazare avoids the naive epistemological orrection that contemporary archaeology 
would seem to provide and instead opts to point out that the entire activity of 
historical writing was different for each epoch, the nature and shape of history and of 
the human relationship to that history were incommensurate with each other. This 
avoidance of narrow ideas of correctness and historical accuracy in favour of a more 
sophisticated and nuanced attention to alternative and complicated ways of viewing 
the arrangement of time hints at the kind of listening to which Grosbard is alluding. 
One could attend to “facts” from a purely archaeological point of view and thereby 
miss the message. This stance does not by any means undermine the message of 
 
97 Supra note 9 at 6. 
98 Lazare, “False Testament”, supra note 92. 
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secular archaeology, which, as the shrine of the book glorifies, has contributed a 
cornucopia of awesome and earth-shaking revelations.  
 Why not attend to the vision (as opposed to the facts) that each is presenting? It is 
clear where the anxiety surrounding such a demand for deep attention to the other 
flows from—for example, I don’t seriously contemplate arguing my partner’s father, a 
Holocaust survivor, out of his tenacious affection for the only state that provided a 
refuge for the only other two of his two hundred family members who survived. The 
origins of the perception of existential threat to all that one holds dear and familiar, on 
both sides of the green line, are evident. The source of the anxiety is palpable and 
extraordinarily well documented on both sides. But where is the harm? 
XII. History and Memory 
 Lazare manifests a sort of kindness to the post-exhilic priests in his statement; an 
admonition not to judge them by a wholly alien set of referents. The kind of attention 
that this passage solicits is also a kind of detachment—a willingness to detach oneself 
from familiar moorings in order to float, even for a moment, over the kind of place 
from which such perspectives can be generated.  
 This detachment, and its attendant (and anxiety-producing) sense that the moral 
gravity that is most intimately familiar to us has lost some of its hold on things, can 
seem to present an excluded middle to a religious sensibility. The Jewish historian 
Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi, in his distinction between Jewish memory and Jewish 
history, depicts this seemingly intractble opposition between the detachment of 
modernity and the engagement of religious feeling. Yerushalmi is devoted to writing 
about a people who prototypically construe th ir religion as unfolding within history. 
As he points out, “No more dramatic evidence is needed for the dominant place of 
history in ancient Israel than the overriding fact that even God is known only insofar 
as he reveals himself ‘historically’.”99 Although he notes that his subject is, at core, 
historical, Yerushalmi is aware of an important distinction between Jewish memory 
and Jewish history. The obligation to remember, the call to Zakhor, is not something 
that is fulfilled by an attention to historical detail and fact. It is something that is 
executed in ritual and tradition, embodied and sustained in collective rehearsals of 
group memory. Jewish memory, embodied and carried forward in these vehicles, most 
particularly between the fall of the Second Temple and the Haskalah (or Jewish 
Enlightenment) of the eighteenth century, was not synonymous with Jewish historical 
writing, which had virtually no presence throughout that long period.  
 Indeed the emergence of Jewish historiography took over just as collective 
Jewish memory was waning, and the transition had virtually nothing accidental about 
it. Yerushalmi argues that Jewish historical writing can only fully emerge when a 
collective and ongoing commitment to Jewish memory falters. As he notes,  
 
99 Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi, Zakhor: Jewish History and Jewish Memory (Seattle: University of 
Washington Press, 1996) at 89. 
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There is an inherent tension in modern Jewish historiography even though most 
often it is not felt on the surface nor even acknowledged. To the degree that this 
historiography is indeed “modern” and demands to be taken seriously, it must at 
least functionally repudiate premises that were basic to all Jewish conceptions 
of history in the past. In effect, it must stand in sharp opposition to its own 
subject matter, not on this or that detail, but concerning the vital core: the belief 
that divine providence is not only an ultimate but an active causal factor in 
Jewish history, and the related belief n the uniqueness of Jewish history 
itself.100 
Jewish history, a product of the modern era, both operates at the demise of Jewish 
memory, and is also to some extent the cause of that demise, as it has a vocation to 
recreate “an ever more detailed past whose shapes and textures memory does not 
recognize.”101 The rise of Jewish historiography, then, emerges out of a sharp break in 
the continuous transmission of Jewish memory through the rituals exhorted in the 
phrase Zakhor. “In this sense,” Yerushalmi writes, “history becomes what it had never 
been before—the faith of fallen Jews.” 102 
 This opposition between the sensibilities of history and memory is a parallel to 
the cartographic and legal oppositions that have preoccupied this paper, respectively 
focused on place and injustice. Though so familiar to us as to have been almost 
completely naturalized, history is dependent on a highly contingent sense of time that 
accompanies contemporary cartography’s sense of space. It is based on a framework 
of isochronal time (now increasingly digitized), where each beat of time is equivalent 
though unrepeatable and only invested superfluously (as a topographical map might 
have a toponymic overlay) with human meaning.  
 To come full circle with the Globe and Mail article on the tinderbox of the 
Temple Mount/Haram El-Sharif that opened this paper, the passage of time between 
the opening of writing and this closing can be marked in discrete and equivalent units 
that are mute about the significance of that passage. By analogy with the cartographic 
pretension that its understanding of accuracy more and more closely approximates 
reality, through the neutrality of that metronome, historical writing aspires to being 
tethered to an accumulation of discrete points, moments big and small being 
measured against this utterly impersonal march of seconds. But moments of 
isochronal time are not so much actual fcts as virtual facts—as Gilles-Gaston 
Granger has characterized the data of science in general—, objects of a schematic 
model rather than perceived reality. It is a fact that has already been “completely 
determined within a system or network of concepts.”103  
 
100 Ibid. 
101 Ibid. at 94. 
102 Ibid. at 86. 
103 Geoffrey Samuel, “Epistemology and Comparative Law: Contributions from the Sciences and 
Social Sciences” in Mark Van Hoecke, ed., Epistemology and Methodology of Comparative Law 
(Portland: Hart, 2004) at 45. 
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 It is not as though, within its own frame of reference, historiography does not 
generate more accurate understandings of the past, does not advance historical 
knowledge. Just as the epistemological and representational values associated with a 
particular cartographic enterprise will generat  the contours and outlines of particular 
maps, the schematizations associated with isochronal time generate a progressive 
account out of moments so depicted. This understanding of time as isochronal allows 
for neighbouring and connected epistemologies that are reliant upon this 
understanding of time to be extended and to advance as they recur to it.  
 Modern history writing is one of those n ighboring and connected epistemologies 
that apprehend moments in a manner analogous to the cartographic apprehension of 
space and the scientific apprehension of virtual objects. The naive pretension of the 
historical framing of time is analogous tohe pretensions of archaeology and 
cartography: that their frames are devoid of narrative content; that they do not tell a 
tale but present a cumulatively more progressive revelation of a narrative-free world. 
The emboldening admonition of Lazare or the lament of writers like Yerushalmi 
seems to indicate that those committed to this revelation are, of logical necessity, 
fallen. Yerushalmi, in particular, is aware that there are other ways of reading those 
moments, big and small, other schemas that incorporate the time that has passed 
between the opening of writing and this closing, crammed with its daily dose of 
newsworthy details—other ways of reading the significance of intervening events.  
 Isochronal time is represented as insignificant just as the modern cartography’s 
landscape itself is inert and narrative-free. The kind of detachment that the scientific 
world view demands, when extrapolated to the human “sciences” (including 
cartography, archaeology, anthropology, history) is one that is a priori excluded from 
a religious viewpoint, in which each rock and contour and ritual and moment is 
evidence of a history that can only be intimated from afar. The same “things”, from 
another vantage point, tell a different story; they are not “things” but signs. 
 I am not so certain that the place where history and memory meet needs to be the 
place of the faith of the fallen—of those committed exclusively to the silence of God 
and the Babel of human history, though the points where the presence of one excludes 
the presence of the other should be acknowledged. After all, these points of 
divergence have often been quite self-consciously chosen, as a better way, as an 
explicit argument against what has gone before.  
 Though recognizing the points of radical incommensurability, I am not so certain 
that this wholly mundane space needs to be the only viable middle ground, Mount 
Moriah transformed, ultimately, into a seamless archaeological park with residual 
surface rights granted to religion. In this regard, the old city of Jerusalem, with its 
quarters and walls and, on the Haram itself, its intimately protruding and abutting 
world views, endlessly intersected and traversed by a still incomprehensible human 
history, offers up a good metaphor for an alternative place to begin mapping the space 
at the intersection of several world views, some historical, some secular, some 
religious.  
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 I don’t really have much to offer up as an alternative commitment other than 
metaphor. It would be a metaphor of a kind of lightness, a kind of relative 
weightlessness, a detachment from some of the dragging certainties of familiar forms 
of life and a recognition that forms of life are, above all, attitudes to the world. The 
virtues of tolerance and multiculturalism, even the domestic entrenchment of these 
values in thing like anti-hate laws and the international entrenchment of them in 
declarations of human rights and refugee conventions, seem too trite and fragile and 
innocuously Canadian to carry the ambulance loads of grief and despair on either side 
of the green line. The metaphor that pulls those pragmatic arrangements, however, 
may indeed be capable of carrying more weight.  
 This is partly because metaphors are imbedded in a way of reading the world that 
is more narrative than expository, as cartographic, historical, and archaeological texts 
tend to be. And metaphors don’t correct prior metaphors; don’t suggest that they are 
more accurate than another. A metaphor cannot be disproved. Rather metaphors are 
more or less compelling, more or less artful, more or less capture the imagination. 
 And this metaphorical way of reading archaeology and history, cartography and 
law, is consistent with the argument of this paper. I have been tracing, through this 
discussion about cartography and archaeology, a certain aspect of that modern 
detachment, one that for itself might make the claim that accepting its premises 
means excluding the validity of others, and, if accepted, in the spirit of quad est 
desmontratum, that a universal reality has been disclosed. The arguments I have been 
making about the representational and rhetorical dimensions of modern epistemology 
suggest that such pretensions are effective by virtue of the power of their persuasive 
results and ignoring the Möbius strip-like nature of their arguments—how tied the 
conclusion is to the prior acceptance of arbitrarily established criteria of accuracy. 
Each is arguing, with utterly compelling persuasive force for insiders, that their 
invention of the present and the future rests on a bedrock past. If the modern sciences 
of humanity demand that we recognize the contingency of prior histories, a  
representational analysis of how they convey their authority obliges us to pay 
attention to the embeddedness of contemporary ones. 
 The understanding that modern science also tells a tale, albeit a dominant and 
domineering one, does not by any means suggest that it should be jettisoned. The 
accounts that it reveals are so indisputably fulsome and compelling that only a fool 
would question their veracity. But there may be room for a middle ground of history 
that is both prophetic and mundane at the same time; a shrine for things that are both 
precious and hallowed; a clearing of space for the multiple cartographies of place; a 
common law for several senses of injustice. 
 This postmodern middle ground does not need to lead to a weightless, 
uncommitted detachment. The map of this metaphorical middle ground might well 
look more like the angle from the kite, suspended between Jerusalem and its heavens.  
 That sense of delight in the given world has kinship with not only the religious 
movements that populate Jerusalem, but also with the spirit of secularism that 
pervades the streets. It’s not far from the perspective of cartographers who have a  
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tenderness for maps often sorer than their tenderness for the terrain that the map 
conveys. In fact it is hard to envisage a cartographer who does not also love maps for 
their own sake, who does not, every so often, pass their eyes and hands over them, 
both thoughtfully and lovingly; does not take that engagingly detached pleasure in 
maps and how they tell a story about a place.  
 This may seem like a coldly detached way of beholding maps, not unlike the 
tableau vivant orientalism to which so many of the beholden have objected. It’s more 
engaged than that, though it does simultaneously acquire some of its capacity for 
flight from the struggle to describe even its own skin dispassionately, like the painful 
task of writing clinically about one’s family of origin as though they could be 
assessed just like any other case study. 
 The vision of the kite flying over all of the Jerusalems—past, present, and 
future—is not detached in (only) this objectifying way. Literally it is attached to the 
ground to where it must eventually return—a connection without which it would 
cease to fly as a kite, crashing pathetically to the ground after a brief escape, tangling 
itself in the wires and branches. That sense of exaltation in the given world has 
kinship with not only the religious movements that populate Jerusalem and aspire to 
soar above it, but also with the spirit of secularism that pervades the streets. It could 
be a metaphorical substratum of a cartography of the Middle Ground. 
    
